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ABSTRACT 
Many sex education curricula currently used in public schools indoctrinate students in gender 
stereotypes. As expressed in the title of one article: “If You Don’t Aim to Please, Don’t Dress to 
Tease,” and Other Public School Sex Education Lessons Subsidized by You, the Federal 
Taxpayer, Jennifer L. Greenblatt, 14 Tex. J. on C.L. & C.R. 1 (2008). Other lessons pertain not 
only to responsibility for sexual activity but to lifelong approaches to family life and individual 
achievement. One lesson, for example, instructs students that, in marriage, men need sex from 
their wives and women need financial support from their husbands. 
This Article first describes the ways in which teaching sex stereotypes may affect children, 
highlighting the need for further empirical research in this area. Second, it critiques the extant 
feminist legal response to gender-biased sex education curricula, particularly the use of precedent 
dealing with governmental perpetuation of stereotypes; those precedents cannot be incorporated 
wholesale into this context. Finally, to correct this analytical gap, this Article connects the sex 
education issue to the existing scholarly literature on indoctrination of schoolchildren, a literature 
that has hooks in both equal protection and the First Amendment. The First Amendment principles 
developed in this literature provide the missing link to explain the constitutional flaw in sex 
stereotyping at school. The result is an endorsement standard, based on a blending of equal 
protection and First Amendment doctrine:  public school students should not be inculcated in 
values whose entrenchment by government is contrary to the constitutional commitment to sex 
equality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What did your children learn in school today?  If your children 
take sex education, it may have been this: 
Deep inside every man is a knight in shining armor, ready to rescue a 
maiden and slay a dragon.  When a man feels trusted, he is free to be the 
strong, protecting man he longs to be. 
Imagine a knight traveling through the countryside.  He hears a 
princess in distress and rushes gallantly to slay the dragon.  The princess 
calls out, “I think this noose will work better!” and throws him a rope.  As 
she tells him how to use the noose, the knight obliges her and kills the 
dragon.  Everyone is happy, except the knight, who doesn’t feel like a he-
ro.  He is depressed and feels unsure of himself.  He would have pre-
ferred to use his own sword. 
The knight goes on another trip.  The princess reminds him to take 
the noose.  The knight hears another maiden in distress.  He remembers 
how he used to feel before he met the princess; with a surge of confi-
dence, he slays the dragon with his sword.  All the townspeople rejoice, 
and the knight is a hero.  He never returned to the princess.  Instead, he 
lived happily ever after in the village, and eventually married the mai-
den—but only after making sure she knew nothing about nooses. 
Moral of the story:  occasional assistance may be all right, but too 
much will lessen a man’s confidence or even turn him away from his 
princess.1 
This story is part of a popular sex education curriculum that is feder-
ally funded and widely used in public schools.2  For three decades, 
the federal government has funded sex education programs that ad-
vocate “abstinence-only until marriage,” to the exclusion of any in-
struction on other ways to prevent pregnancy or avoid sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs).3  The class time freed up by that exclu-
sion has, in many schools, been filled with wide-ranging “values” in-
struction that is riddled with pressure to conform to traditional gend-
er norms.4 
 
 1 Blue Balls for the Red States, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 2005, at 22–24. 
 2 See Choosing the Best SOUL MATE Review, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?pageId=922 (last visited Feb. 18, 2011); 
see also CHOOSING THE BEST, www.choosingthebest.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (tout-
ing the number of students reached and offering information on obtaining federal grants 
to underwrite the program). 
 3 Abstinence programs may discuss such methods only to point out failure rates.  See infra 
note 15 (quoting the federal definition of a qualified abstinence-only program).  In 2010 
the federal government began funding comprehensive programs that include instruction 
on how to use contraception and avoid STDs, in addition to continuing to fund absti-
nence-only programs.  See infra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra text accompanying notes 40–69.  See generally MINORITY STAFF, SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIONS DIV., H.R. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, THE CONTENT OF FEDERALLY 
FUNDED ABSTINENCE-ONLY EDUCATION PROGRAMS, 108th Cong. (2004) (prepared for 
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Sex education classes do not necessarily aim to teach students 
facts, skills, or analytical methods.  Unlike history or literature or 
math or even shop or home economics, sex education exhorts stu-
dents about how to live the most intimate parts of their lives.  And in 
many American classrooms, the exhortations are gendered.  Boys are 
taught that they should focus on achievement and that when they 
marry they should provide their wives with financial support and af-
fection.5  Girls are taught that they should focus on relationships, as-
sume primary responsibility for controlling boys’ lust for premarital 
sex and, once safely married, fulfill their husbands’ needs for admira-
tion and sex.6  This view is expressed in the title, If You Don’t Aim to 
Please, Don’t Dress to Tease,” and Other Public School Sex education Lessons 
Subsidized by You, the Federal Taxpayer.7 
This indoctrination into archaic roles appears to occur primarily 
in the “abstinence-only” sex education programs that were supported 
and funded by the Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II administra-
tions.  In 2009, the Obama administration announced that it would 
switch the federal preference, so that comprehensive sex education 
would be funded but abstinence-only programs would not.8  The new 
funding for comprehensive programs was included in the health care 
reform legislation passed in 2010.  As the bill passed through Con-
gress, however, abstinence-only funding was reinstated.  The final bill 
allocated $50 million per year for abstinence-only programs and $75 
million per year for comprehensive, evidence-based programs known 
as “personal responsibility education.”9 
Even when it appeared that the federal funding would disappear, 
a substantial minority of states planned to adhere to abstinence-only 
 
Rep. Henry A. Waxman), [hereinafter the Waxman Report]; Why kNOw??  Review, 
SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., http://www.communityactionkit.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=995(last visited Feb. 18, 2011) [hereinafer 
Why kNOw??]; JULIE F. KAY & ASHLEY JACKSON, LEGAL MOMENTUM, SEX, LIES, AND 
STEREOTYPES:  HOW ABSTINENCE-ONLY PROGRAMS HARM WOMEN AND GIRLS (2008), avail-
able at http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/sexlies_stereotypes2008.pdf.   
 5 See infra text accompanying notes 56–62. 
 6 See infra text accompanying notes 44–55. 
 7 Jennifer L. Greenblatt, “If You Don’t Aim to Please, Don’t Dress to Tease,” and Other Public 
School Sex Education Lessons Subsidized by You, the Federal Taxpayer, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1 
(2008). 
 8 See Sarah Kliff, The Future of Abstinence, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 27, 2009), 
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/10/26/the-future-of-abstinence.html. 
 9 Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2954, 124 Stat. 119, 353 
(2010) (Restoration of Funding for Abstinence Education, amending 42 U.S.C. § 710); id. 
§ 2953 (Personal Responsibility Education, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 713).  For the dollar 
amounts, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 710(d), 713(f) (2006).  The funding in each case is authorized 
for five years. 
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programs at their own expense.10  In addition, there is every reason to 
expect that proponents of abstinence-only programs will strive to in-
corporate as much of their agenda as possible into the comprehen-
sive curricula.  Because abstaining from sex outside marriage is only 
one piece of the ideology these proponents seek to transmit to stu-
dents, the sensible strategy for them is to infuse the comprehensive 
programs with as much of that ideology as possible.  Given the see-
mingly universal acceptance of the “abstinence” banner as at least a 
large component of all sex education, including comprehensive pro-
grams, that should not be difficult.11 
Feminists who object to rank sexism in public school curricula 
have begun pondering whether a remedy might lie in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.12  There are, however, important gaps in the budding 
feminist analysis of sex education as Sexism 101.  The most detailed 
extant analysis of biased sex education curricula from a legal feminist 
perspective is an issue brief published by the American Constitution 
Society (ACS).13  While well-argued in several respects, the brief is 
dangerously simplistic in its use of current equal protection doctrine.  
It uses Supreme Court precedent on gender stereotypes in a way that 
courts are likely to find (with justification) to be disingenuous and 
alarming.  This Article draws on First Amendment principles and 
scholarship to provide both theoretical depth and a more precise ar-
ticulation of the constitutional harm.  It proposes that equal protec-
 
 10 See Kliff, supra note 8. 
 11 Opponents of abstinence-only sex education have started describing their preferred al-
ternative as “abstinence plus” rather than “comprehensive” sex education, suggesting that 
the advocates of abstinence education are winning at least the rhetorical battle.  See, e.g., 
Nicholas D. Kristof, Bush’s Sex Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at A21.  The “personal 
responsibility education” funded by the health care reform law is required toeducate stu-
dents about “both abstinence and contraception for the prevention of pregnancy and 
sexually transmited infections . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 713(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
 12 See, e.g., Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig:  Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 
EMORY L.J. 1235, 1257–61 (2007); Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism and Constitu-
tional Citizenship, in GENDER EQUALITY:  DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 107, 
116–17 (Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009); Michelle Fine & Sara I. 
McClelland, The Politics of Teen Women’s Sexuality:  Public Policy and the Adolescent Female 
Body, 56 EMORY L.J. 993, 1037–38 (2007); Greenblatt, supra note 7, at 13–18; Cornelia Pil-
lard, Our Other Reproductive Choices:  Equality in Sex Education, Contraceptive Access, and Work-
Family Policy, 56 EMORY L.J. 941, 946–62 (2007); Danielle LeClair, Comment, Let’s Talk 
About Sex Honestly:  Why Federal Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage Education Programs Discrimi-
nate Against Girls, Are Bad Public Policy, and Should Be Overturned, 21 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 291 
(2006).   
 13 Bonnie Scott Jones & Michelle Movahed, Lesson One:  Your Gender Is Your Destiny—The 
Constitutionality of Teaching Sex Stereotypes in Abstinence-Only Programs, AM. CONSTITUTION 
SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY (Sept. 2008), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Jones-Movahed Issue 
Brief.pdf [hereinafter ACS Brief]. 
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tion analysis of biased curricula should be modeled on the endorse-
ment test that is used for identifying violations of the Establishment 
Clause in the same context:  public school instruction. 
Part I of this Article discusses the stereotyped content of many sex 
education curricula and the ways in which promoting those stereo-
types in the classroom can harm students.  Part II discusses how these 
harms fit into equal protection doctrine.  It concludes that equal pro-
tection doctrine as currently constituted does not adequately address 
the problem of stereotyped sex education because the role of stereo-
types in prior sex equality cases is different from their role in an edu-
cational environment. 
Part III connects the sex education problem to existing scholar-
ship and jurisprudence on the general problem of imposing values 
on students in public schools.  The problem of sex bias in sex educa-
tion classes provides a good opportunity for courts to grapple with 
questions about the role of public schools that have been raised in 
the scholarly literature.  At the same time, because the stereotyping in 
sex education is particularly blatant, it does not present more difficult 
questions about subtle and unintended bias.  First Amendment doc-
trine indicates that although some degree of value imposition is a ne-
cessary consequence of public schooling, a few specific categories of 
governmental indoctrination of school children are impermissible.  
Because the entrenchment of traditional sex roles by state action is 
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause, promotion of archaic 
sex stereotypes should be added to that short list of categories.  
Courts can borrow from First Amendment principles to restrict the 
teaching of stereotypes in the same way that they restrict religious in-
doctrination.  Public schools should not be permitted to endorse sex 
stereotypes and traditional sex roles as normatively desirable. 
I.  SEX STEREOTYPES IN SEX EDUCATION 
Sex education in the United States is a political football with a lot 
of federal dollars attached.  Both sides of the political fight recognize 
the opportunity to instill in school children the values they consider 
to be correct on a range of issues implicating sexuality and family life.  
The explicit effort to manipulate intimate choices, the religious over-
tones of sexual morality, and the need to address gendered roles and 
expectations all combine to create a veritable smorgasbord of oppor-
tunities to run afoul of the Constitution. 
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A.  The Content and Funding of Sex Education 
Sex education in the United States is taught in two main forms, 
known as comprehensive sexuality education and abstinence-only 
education.  Comprehensive sex education typically promotes absti-
nence for young people, but it also offers students accurate informa-
tion on contraception and the prevention of STDs.14  On the other 
hand, abstinence-only sex education advises students to completely 
abstain from sex until marriage and excludes any discussion of con-
traception or prevention of STDs, except to discuss failure rates.15 
Those who support abstinence-only sex education claim that it 
fosters a sense of morality among adolescents, works to keep sex with-
in marriage, and helps teens avoid the emotional and physical prob-
lems that could come with sex before marriage.  They believe that 
comprehensive courses actually encourage teens to engage in prema-
rital sex and that comprehensive programs are a direct cause of in-
creased levels of STDs and teen pregnancy.16 
Those who support comprehensive sex education argue that it 
provides teens with the information they need to make their own de-
 
 14 According to Sexuality Information and Education Council of the U.S. (SIECUS), a com-
prehensive program should be structured around four main goals:  “to provide accurate 
information about human sexuality; to provide an opportunity for young people to de-
velop and understand their values, attitudes, and insights about sexuality; to help young 
people develop relationships and interpersonal skills; and to help young people exercise 
responsibility regarding sexual relationships, which includes addressing abstinence, pres-
sures to become prematurely involved in sexual intercourse, and the use of contraception 
and other sexual health measures.”  Sexuality Education Q & A, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. 
COUNCIL OF THE U.S., http://www.siecus.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage
&pageid=521&grandparentID=477&parentID=514 (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 15 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2) (2006) (defining abstinence education according to eight points:  a 
qualified abstinence-only program “(A) has as its exclusive purpose, teaching the social, 
psychological, and health gains to be realized by abstaining from sexual activity; (B) 
teaches abstinence from sexual activity outside marriage as the expected standard for all 
school age children; (C) teaches that abstinence from sexual activity is the only certain 
way to avoid out-of-wedlock pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and other associated 
health problems; (D) teaches that a mutually faithful monogamous relationship in con-
text of marriage is the expected standard of human sexual activity; (E) teaches that sexual 
activity outside of the context of marriage is likely to have harmful psychological and 
physical effects; (F) teaches that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have harmful 
consequences for the child, the child’s parents, and society; (G) teaches young people 
how to reject sexual advances and how alcohol and drug use increases vulnerability to 
sexual advances; and (H) teaches the importance of attaining self-sufficiency before en-
gaging in sexual activity”). 
 16 See, e.g., Robert E. Rector, Melissa Pardue & Shannon Martin, What Do Parents Want 
Taught in Sex Education Programs?, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2004), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/01/What-Do-Parents-Want-Taught-in-
Sex-Education-Programs (arguing in favor of abstinence education); see also Kliff, supra 
note 8 (quoting advocates of abstinence). 
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cisions about sexual activity while often encouraging them to refrain 
from sex until they are more mature.  Supporters also argue that 
most existing abstinence-only programs are in fact detrimental to 
students:  they contain factual inaccuracies and misleading informa-
tion, thereby contributing to public health problems; they unconsti-
tutionally promote religion in public schools; and they inculcate 
teens with gender stereotypes and negative attitudes about sex.17 
1.  Funding Streams 
Since 1996, three federal programs have supported and funded 
abstinence-only sex education programs:  the Adolescent Family Life 
Act;18 Title V block grants;19 and direct grants for Community-Based 
Abstinence Education (CBAE).20  The Adolescent Family Life Act was 
enacted in 1981, earmarking a portion of the Health and Human 
Services budget for abstinence-only education.21  Title V block grants 
were put in place by the Clinton administration in 1996, with funding 
appropriated to abstinence-only programs as part of welfare reform.22  
These block grants were the main source of funding for abstinence-
only programs.  Additional money was made available in 2000, when 
CBAE grants were authorized as “Special Projects of Regional and 
National Significance.”23 
Abstinence-only programs are especially popular in the south, 
with over half of all funding ($82,267,900) allocated to sixteen south-
ern states in 2008.24  Twenty-two mostly northern states refused to par-
 
 17 See generally COMMUNITY ACTION KIT, http://www.communityactionkit.org (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2011) (arguing in favor of comprehensive sex education). 
 18 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z–10 (2006). 
 19 42 U.S.C. § 710 (2006). 
 20 42 U.S.C. § 1310 (2006). 
 21 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, § 931, 95 Stat. 367, 570 
(1981) (amending the Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. 300 et seq.). 
 22 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-
193, § 912, 110 Stat. 2105, 2354 (1996) (amending Title V of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 710). 
 23 Fact Sheet:  Community-Based Abstinence Education Program, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/mchb/abstinence/cbofs.pdf; see also A Brief History of Federal Ab-
stinence-Only-Until-Marriage Funding, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.siecus.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=1263 (last visited). 
 24 Sexuality Education and Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage Programs in the States:  An Overview, 
Fiscal Year 2008, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.siecus.org/_data/global/images/State%20Profiles%20FY%2008/Opening%
20Docs%20FY%2008/5%20Overview.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Programs 
in the States 2008] (summarizing states’ acceptance of and attitudes toward Title V fund-
ing).  SIECUS also publishes individual state profiles showing acceptance of federal fund-
ing and other details about sexuality education in each state.  A Portrait of Sexuality Educa-
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ticipate in the Title V abstinence-only programs that year,25 and seven 
states refused to accept any sort of federal support for abstinence-only 
education.26  The rejection of federal funds by nearly half the states 
sent a striking message during a time of severe economic downturn, 
as many states could have used the money.  They were unwilling, 
however, to take these funds in exchange for teaching abstinence-
only curricula. 
In 2009, the Obama administration announced that it was elimi-
nating federal funding for abstinence-only programs from the 2010 
budget; instead, the administration would favor evidence-based sex 
education programs.27  This new funding for comprehensive sex edu-
cation was surely welcomed by the states that had previously turned 
down federal money rather than teach abstinence-only sex education.  
By contrast, the states that supported abstinence-only sex education 
scrambled to secure private funding to keep those programs afloat.28  
Thus, in this area, it appears that the federal spending power is not 
sufficient to sway many states’ substantive policy decisions in either 
direction. 
The scramble to save abstinence programs abated with the passage 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.29  The Act 
appropriated $75 million per year for five years to support a form of 
comprehensive sex education referred to in the Act as “personal re-
sponsibility education.”30  In addition, however, the Act extended $50 
million per year of abstinence-only funding under the Social Security 
Act for the same period.31  States can therefore now obtain federal 
funding for either type of program. 
 
tion and Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage Programs in the States, Fiscal Year 2009, SEXUALITY 
INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., http://www.siecus.org/ in-
dex.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=487 (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 25 They are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  Programs in the States 
2008, supra note 24, at 2.   
 26 They are Delaware, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wyoming.  
Id. at 1. 
 27 Sharon Jayson, Obama Budget Shifts Money from Abstinence-Only Sex Education, USA TODAY, 
May 12, 2009, at 10B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-05-11-
abstinence-only_N.htm. 
 28 Kliff, supra note 8 (describing efforts to find alternative funding). 
 29 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 30 § 2953, 124 Stat. at 347 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 713). 
 31 § 2954, 124 Stat. at 352 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 710(d)).  The amendment reinstating 
funding for abstinence programs was added by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) during a 
committee debate on the bill.  Rob Stein, Health Bill Restores $250 Million in Abstinence-
Education Funds, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 27, 2010, at A9. 
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The Obama administration’s unsuccessful attempt to reverse the 
federal funding policy came in response to increasingly widespread 
and documented complaints about abstinence-only programs for fac-
tual inaccuracy, religious content, and gender stereotypes, as well as 
several studies finding that they failed to accomplish their goal of in-
fluencing students to delay sex until marriage.  The most important 
early critique was a report released by Representative Henry Waxman 
in 2004, criticizing eleven of the thirteen most popular federally 
funded programs.32  The nonprofit group Legal Momentum (former-
ly NOW Legal Defense Fund) issued a report along similar lines in 
2008,33 and the Sexuality Information and Education Center of the 
United States (SIECUS) has an ongoing project of reviewing sex edu-
cation curricula with special attention to these and other flaws.34  Al-
though these critiques have focused on abstinence-only programs, all 
of these features would, of course, raise concerns regardless of the 
type of program in which they appeared. 
Most of the factual inaccuracies reported to appear in sex educa-
tion programs pertain to overstating the dangers of sexual activity 
and understating the effectiveness and safety of contraception and 
methods for avoiding and treating STDs.35  Programs with these sorts 
of inaccuracies appear to have consciously selected fear and shame, 
rather than accuracy, as their pedagogical strategy.36  “Sexual Health 
Today,” for example, claims that touching another person’s genitals 
“can result in pregnancy.”37  Another program purports to inform 
students of the symptoms of common STDs.  The symptoms listed, 
however, are those of advanced disease, which make STDs frighten-
ing, rather than the early symptoms that would enable a person to 
 
 32 See generally Waxman Report, supra note 4. 
 33 See generally KAY, supra note 4. 
 34 See generally Curricula and Speaker Reviews, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?pageId=922 (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 35 See Waxman Report, supra note 4, at 9–10, 12 (summarizing inaccuracies in several pro-
grams).  See generally Curricula and Speaker Reviews, supra note 34 (documenting this kind 
of inaccuracy in many of the programs).  Many programs are also palpably hostile to 
abortion rights.  For example, the “Sex Respect” program advocates against abortion and 
claims that it inclines women to suicide.  See Sex Respect Review, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. 
COUNCIL OF THE U.S., http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.
viewpage&pageid=990 (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (discussing the curriculum’s anti-
abortion advocacy); Questions from Students, SEX RESPECT, http://www.sexrespect.com/
StudentQ.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (stating that abortion is “a source of depres-
sion, even suicide”). 
 36 See Curricula and Speaker Reviews, supra note 34 (describing most of the reviewed programs 
as “fear-based”). 
 37 Waxman Report, supra note 4, at 12. 
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detect and treat an illness.38  Many programs discuss the failure rate of 
condoms without disclosing that failure is often a function of user er-
ror.39  One curriculum teaches students that mutual masturbation, 
French kissing, and receiving a blood transfusion in the United States 
would all put them “at risk” for contracting HIV and AIDS.40 
Lessons that associate sex with contamination may do so in gend-
er-specific ways.  For example, one lesson instructs the teacher to call 
a boy to the front of the classroom and hold up a strip of clear pack-
ing tape and tells him that it represents his girlfriend.  The teacher 
sticks the tape to the boy’s forearm.  Unfortunately, the couple breaks 
up.  The teacher tears the girlfriend off the boy’s arm and passes her 
to another boy to repeat the process.  As she is passed from one boy 
to the next, the teacher shows how she is becoming covered with hair, 
body oil, and other debris.  At the end of the exercise, the teacher is 
told to point out to the class that the girlfriend is not only dirty; she 
has lost the ability to “stick” to her man.41 
In another story, a girl tries on her mother’s wedding dress and 
models it for her boyfriend: 
At first, Marcus was overwhelmed at how beautiful Kelly looked.  He 
treated her special, like a person of real honor.  Kelly, on the other hand, 
stopped caring for the dress.  She no longer placed it in its protective 
covering and valued it like a cherished possession.  Because of Kelly’s 
new attitude, the dress lost its beauty and charm.  The dress began to 
look different to Marcus.  It had lost its appeal and attractiveness.  He saw 
Kelly in it all the time.  She wore it rollerblading, biking, bowling and in 
clubs.  The wedding dress had changed its appearance.  It was dirty, 
ripped in some places and simply looked used.  The dress now looked 
like any other dress.  After several weeks, Kelly and Marcus broke up.42 
And for those middle schoolers with good enough instruction in Eng-
lish literature to recognize a flower as a symbol of female sexuality, 
the teacher is instructed to “hold up a beautiful rose”: 
Talk about the petals and how they add color and fragrance to the rose.  
Hand the rose to a student, telling that student to pull off a petal and 
pass it on to another student who also pulls off a petal.  Continue passing 
 
 38 See Why kNOw?, supra note 4. 
 39 See HIS (Healthy Image of Sex) Review, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=1007 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (noting this flaw in several programs). 
 40 WAIT Training Review, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=992 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Reasonable Reasons to Wait Review, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=1005 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
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the rose around until there are no more petals.  At the end, hold up the 
rose.  Ask:  How much value does the rose have now?  Share that the rose 
represents someone who participates in casual sex.  Each time a sexually 
active person gives that most personal part of himself or herself away, 
that person can lose a sense of personal value and worth.  It all comes 
down to self-respect.43 
Associations between sexuality and contamination or poor charac-
ter may also be racially specific.  According to the Legal Momentum 
Report, one curriculum is available in a “Midwest school version” and 
an “urban school version.”  In the urban version, more than half the 
students portrayed are African American, a quarter are Hispanic, and 
a quarter white.  The young African American women are depicted as 
sexually aggressive drug users, and young African American men as 
bound for jail.  In the midwestern materials, the students are over-
whelmingly white and are depicted as “working to maintain their tra-
ditional values.”44 
In many sex education curricula, young women are taught to be 
sexual gatekeepers and are told that young men their age are unable 
to control their sexual urges: 
 Since females generally become aroused less quickly and less easily, 
they are better able to make a thoughtful choice of a partner they 
want to marry.  They can also help young men learn to balance in a 
relationship by keeping physical intimacy from moving forward too 
quickly.45 
 [G]uys think so much more about sex because of testosterone.46 
 Females need to be careful with what they wear, because males are 
looking!  The girl might be thinking fashion, while the boy is think-
ing sex.  For this reason girls have an added responsibility to wear 
modest clothing that doesn’t invite lustful thoughts.47 
 Because girls are usually more talkative, make eye contact more often 
than men, and love to dress in eye-catching ways, they may appear to 
be coming on to a guy when in reality they are just being friendly.  To 
the male, however, he perceives that the girl wants him sexually.  Ask-
 
 43 Choosing the Best PATH and LIFE Review, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=117
5&stopRedirect=1&printview=true (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 44 KAY, supra note 4, at 21. 
 45 Id. at 39 (quoting Lorraine Kenny & Julie Sternberg, Abstinence-Only Education in the 
Courts, 31 SIECUS Report 6, at 26, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/siecus%20article.pdf).   
 46 Id. at 20 (quoting Bruce Cook, Choosing the Best Life:  Leader Guide 7 (2003)). 
 47 Id. (quoting Letter from Steven Brown, Exec. Dir., R.I. ACLU, to Peter McWalters, 
Comm’r, R.I. Dep’t of Educ. (Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://www.riaclu.org/
documents/sex_ed_letter.pdf.   
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ing herself what signals she is sending could save both sexes a lot of 
heartache.48 
 How can girls help boys become virtuous?49 
Girls in the sixth grade are told that their changing bodies have a 
huge effect on boys their age, sending signals the girls do not even 
know they are sending.  These signals can cause unspecified “big 
problems.”50  Whatever these “big problems” might be, it is clear that 
male responsibility is not part of the equation. 
The same attitude appears in the few discussions of sexual assault 
and date rape that appear in these materials.  A unit on preventing 
date rape, also for sixth graders, discusses the topic only in terms of 
the victim’s behavior and asks, “How do some people say NO with 
their words, but YES with their actions or clothing?”51  More crudely, 
the following passage is part of a lesson designed to be presented only 
to boys, while girls are separately instructed about behaving modestly:  
“Generally female dogs allow the male to mount them/get on top of 
them, do their business, and leave.  Some girls appear to act as if they 
want this.”52 
These lessons not only place responsibility for controlling male 
sexual behavior on young women but also assume that young women 
do not have sexual urges of their own.  Women are said to require 
“hours of emotional and mental preparation” for sex.53  When girls 
do want sex, it is either dangerous: 
Tina began to pressure Steve for sex.  He had been abstinent and was 
planning to save sex for marriage.  One night when they were alone, she 
told him that if he truly loved her he would prove his love to her by hav-
ing sex with her.  He refused and left the house.  Their relationship 
ended shortly afterward.  Two months later Steve learned that Tina was 
already pregnant on that night when she was trying to get him to have 
sex with her.  Tina became a single mother at age 18.54 
 
 48 Id. (quoting Kris Frainie, Why kNOw? Abstinence Education Programs:  Curriculum for Sixth 
Grade Through High School:  Teacher’s Manual 122 (2002)).   
 49 HIS (Healthy Image of Sex) Review, supra note 39.   
 50 Why kNOw?, supra note 4. 
 51 Choosing the Best WAY Review, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=118
0&stopRedirect=1 (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 52 HIS (Healthy Image of Sex) Review, supra note 39.   
 53 WAIT Training Review, supra note 40.   
 54 Game Plan Review, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=982&
printview=true (last visited Feb. 18, 2011); see also Aspire Review, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. 
COUNCIL OF THE U.S., http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page. 
viewpage&pageid=974&printview=true (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (utilizing the same sto-
ry with different names). 
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or a character flaw, produced by corrupt society: 
 [A] young man’s natural desire for sex is already strong due to testos-
terone, the powerful male growth hormone.  Females are becoming 
culturally conditioned to fantasize about sex as well.55 
 [I]f Kendra respected herself, would she have given herself to Antonio 
without his commitment to her?56 
Sex education curricula often reach well beyond the topics of sex-
ual activity and reproductive biology to address lifelong gender 
roles.57  Many sex education programs prescribe proper roles for fe-
males and males in dating relationships and in marriage: 
The father gives the bride to the groom because he is the one man who 
has had the responsibility of protecting her throughout her life.  He is 
now giving his daughter to the only other man who will take over this 
protective role.58 
Several programs teach about the “five major needs” of women and 
men in marriage.  See if you can guess which are which: 
 
 
Five Major Needs of Women and Men in Marriage59 
Affection Sexual Fulfillment 
Conversation Recreational Companionship 
Honesty and Openness Physical Attractiveness 
Financial Support Admiration 
Family Commitment Domestic Support 
 
 
Complementing these differentiated roles in heterosexual rela-
tionships are the suggestions for girls’ and boys’ aspirations for their 
adult lives: 
 Women gauge their happiness and judge their success by their rela-
tionships.  Men’s happiness and success hinge on their accomplish-
ments.60 
 Generally, guys are able to focus better on one activity at a time and 
may not connect feelings with actions.  Girls access both sides of the 
 
 55 Sex Respect Review, supra note 35 (emphases added). 
 56 Choosing the Best PATH and LIFE Review, supra note 43 (emphasis added). 
 57 See Waxman Report, supra note 4, at 16 (“Many abstinence-only curricula begin with a 
detailed discussion of differences between boys and girls.  Some of the differences pre-
sented are simply biological.  Several of the curricula, however, present stereotypes as 
scientific fact.”). 
 58 Id. at 17. 
 59 Answer can be found at WAIT Training Review, supra note 40.  
 60 Waxman Report, supra note 4, at 16. 
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brain at once, so they often experience feelings and emotions as part 
of every situation.61 
 Our guy will do well in “success situations” that give him a chance to 
plan and achieve his goal; while our girl will excel in situations that 
allow her to influence and interact with people.62 
Questions that couples are advised to discuss before getting married 
include, “Will the wife work after marriage or will the husband be the 
sole breadwinner?”63 
A final, pervasive stereotype in many sex education classes is the 
complete privileging of heterosexual vaginal intercourse as virtually 
synonymous with “sex” as an activity.64   This emphasis may seem per-
verse in light of the purported state interest in avoiding teen preg-
nancy.  Nonetheless, same-sex and any other sexual activity besides 
penile-vaginal intercourse is, in many curricula, consistently treated 
as deviant.65  One curriculum provides a chart showing a spectrum of 
sexual behavior ranging from hand-holding to sexual intercourse.  
Everything between French kissing and sexual intercourse is denoted 
merely as “Other Stuff.”66  Many curricula overwhelmingly emphasize 
marriage as the only acceptable context for sex without even ac-
knowledging that gay and lesbian students are legally barred from 
marrying in most states.67  Same-sex relationships are ignored or, if 
mentioned, plainly disapproved.68 
Finally, as an instructional method, some abstinence-only pro-
grams require or encourage their students to take virginity pledges, 
in which they personally promise abstinence until marriage.69  More 
 
 61 Id. at 17. 
 62 Choosing the Best SOUL MATE Review, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=118
4&stopRedirect=1&printview=true (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 63 Reasonable Reasons to Wait Review, SEXUALITY INFO. & EDUC. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., 
http://www.communityactionkit.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=1005
&printview=true (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 64 See Curricula and Speaker Reviews, supra note 34.   
 65 See id. 
 66 See Choosing the Best PATH and LIFE Review, supra note 43.   
 67 See, e.g., Choosing the Best SOUL MATE Review, supra note 62; see also 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2) 
(2006) (defining the requirements of abstinence-only programs for purposes of federal 
funding, with a strong emphasis on marriage). 
 68 See Choosing the Best SOUL MATE Review, supra note 62 (criticizing the program for ignor-
ing the existence of same-sex relationships); Sex Respect Review, supra note 35(describing 
the curriculum’s bias against homosexuality); Why kNOw?, supra note 4 (discussing the re-
fusal of the curriculum to acknowledge same-sex relationships). 
 69 Research has found that virginity pledges can be effective in delaying intercourse (al-
though not until marriage), but only when a self-selected subgroup of students takes the 
pledge; if the entire class pledges, the delay effect disappears.  In addition, teens who 
took part in a virginity pledge were found to be one-third less likely to use contraception 
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generally, a curriculum might require students to prepare “personal 
behavior contracts” in which they commit to conform their personal 
lives more closely to the government-sponsored value system in which 
they have been instructed.70 
B.  Effects of Teaching Stereotypes 
The type of programming described above may be affecting teens 
in ways that are yet to be explored.  Most research on the effects of 
sex education instruction has focused on whether sex education pro-
grams accomplish their stated goals of reducing sex, pregnancy, and 
STDs.  Other psychological effects of these programs have yet to be 
studied.  Specifically, these lesson plans may be leading to negative 
gender stereotypes and negative attitudes toward sex via psychologi-
cal phenomena known as priming and stereotype threat. 
According to the literature on priming, memory consists of a large 
network of associations.71  Through everyday experiences, people 
form associations that later facilitate recall.  For example, we often 
pair items that are commonly presented together such as “cat” and 
“dog” or “bread” and “butter.”  If one of these items is presented, it is 
likely that we will recall the other item.  Thus, the first item “primes” 
the association between the two items.  For an everyday example, the 
game show Password relies on the principles of priming.72 
 
when they engaged in sexual activity.  Why kNOw?, supra note 4 (citing Peter Bearman & 
Hannah Brückner, Promising the Future:  Virginity Pledges and First Intercourse, 106 AMER. J. 
SOC. 859, 898–900 (2001)).  Perhaps because they are less likely to use condoms, pledgers 
experience the same rates of STD infection as non-pledgers, even though they delay sex 
and have fewer partners.  See generally Hannah Brückner & Peter Bearman, After the Prom-
ise:  The STD Consequences of Adolescent Virginity Pledges, 36 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 271 
(2005). 
 70 State of Tennessee, Tennessee Health Education Standards 6-8, 4, http://tennessee.gov/
education/ci/health_pe/doc/health_6_8.pdf. (last visited February 18, 2011). 
 71 For discussions of the phenomenon of priming, see E. Tory Higgins, William S. Rholes & 
Carl R. Jones, Category Accessibility and Impression Formation, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 141 (1977); John A. Bargh, Mark Chen & Lara Burrows, Automaticity of Social Be-
havior:  Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 230 (1996); Rob W. Holland, Merel Hendriks & Henk Aarts, Smells Like 
Clean Spirit, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 689 (2005). 
 72 Current research indicates that priming can affect our behaviors, even if we are not con-
sciously aware it is occurring.  In one study, researchers told participants that they would 
be taking part in two unrelated studies.  The first study was a priming task in which the 
participants memorized a list of positive, or a list of negative, words.  In the second study, 
the participants were asked to read a paragraph about a man named Donald, and they 
were to give their impressions of the man.  All participants read the same paragraph de-
scribing Donald’s attributes in ambiguous terms.  Participants’ perceptions of Donald 
were positive or negative depending on which list of words they had memorized.  See Hig-
gins et al., supra note 71. 
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Sex education curricula like those described above may be prim-
ing teens with gender stereotypes and negative attitudes toward sex.  
By pairing sexual activity with motherhood (and the responsibilities 
thereof) and paternal financial obligation, this type of education 
teaches teens to associate sex with traditional gender roles.  Addi-
tionally, by teaching associations between sex and fear, sex education 
could be priming teens with negative attitudes toward sex in the fu-
ture.  This in turn could hinder their future relationships and normal 
sexual functioning as adults, and the length of these effects is un-
known. 
Children are socialized at a very early age to behave in ways that 
are considered to be gender appropriate.  As a consequence, gender 
role stereotypes become strong and are easily activated when a per-
son is forming judgments of others.73  Perceptions of behaviors, traits, 
and roles of women and men are often influenced by societal expec-
tations for what is considered to be gender appropriate.74  Through 
this socialization process, expectations about what constitutes gender-
appropriate behaviors become very strong, and those who violate 
gender-role expectations tend to be disliked.75 
Since the mid- to late nineteenth century, gender-role norms with 
regard to sexuality have upheld a double standard in which women 
 
   In another study, participants were asked to form sentences with sets of words pro-
vided by the researcher.  Half of the participants were primed with words that are stereo-
typically associated with the elderly (gray, wrinkled, retired, Florida, bingo, etc.), while 
the remaining participants were exposed to neutral words.  After the participants created 
their sentences, they were dismissed; however, the study was not over.  At this point, a 
second experimenter recorded the time it took the participants to walk from the research 
room to an elevator.  Participants who were primed with stereotypes of the elderly walked 
to the elevator much more slowly than those who were not primed with the age-related 
words.  See Bargh et al., supra note 71, at 236–38. 
   More recently, researchers exposed participants to the scent of an all-purpose cleaner 
and found that those who were exposed to the cleaner were quicker to identify cleaning-
related words, recalled more cleaning-related activities when describing daily activities, 
and were more likely to keep a desk clean when eating a crumbling cookie.  See Holland 
et al., supra note 71. 
 73 See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Stereotyping and Prejudice, 7 
PSYCHOL. OF PREJUDICE 55, 55 (1994). 
 74 See generally Kay Deaux & Mary E. Kite, Thinking About Gender, in ANALYZING GENDER:  A 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 92 (B.B. Hess & M.M. Paludi eds., 1985). 
 75 See Norma Costrich et al., When Stereotypes Hurt:  Three Studies of Penalties for Sex-Role Rever-
sals, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 520, 522–23, 528–29 (1975) (finding that men 
perceived as passive and dependent and women who acted aggressively and assertively re-
ceived lower popularity ratings); D.W. Rajecki, Rebecca De Graaf-Kaser & Jeffrey Lee 
Rasmussen, New Impressions and More Discrimination:  Effects of Individuation on Gender-Label 
Stereotypes, 27 SEX ROLES 171, 184 (1992) (reporting that masculine men were likely to be 
favored over non-feminine women and feminine women were likely to be favored over 
non-masculine men). 
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are expected to be chaste and men are given more allowances when it 
comes to their sexual behavior.76  This double standard is reflected in 
the Madonna-Whore dichotomy, in which women are most often ca-
tegorized as either good and sexually chaste or bad and sexually 
promiscuous.  This dichotomy may lead young women and girls to 
fear being perceived as sexually promiscuous,77 as this could be de-
trimental for their reputations.  Instead, these young women might 
decide to perpetuate gender-role stereotypes and adhere to tradi-
tional gender roles in order to maintain their reputations.  Addition-
ally, research has found that these double standards influence how 
men perceive women as potential lifetime mates.  Specifically, al-
though promiscuous women are preferred for short-term dating 
partners, men are less likely to perceive these women as potential life-
time mates or marriage partners.78  Sex education curricula that link 
sex with fear and contamination, emphasize female responsibility for 
sexual gatekeeping, and advocate traditional gender roles in families 
could play a substantial role in reinforcing stereotypical associations. 
Consistent with the literature on priming, teaching sex education 
in a fear-based manner could also lead to the development of nega-
tive attitudes toward sex.  Such attitudes are promoted by curricula 
that are based on the notion that sexual intercourse outside of mar-
riage is dangerous.79  Premarital sex is often compared to harmful, 
immoral, and unlawful behavior.  It is associated with “poverty, hear-
tache, disease, and even DEATH.”80 
An additional concern with respect to school-based reinforcement 
of gender stereotypes is the phenomenon of stereotype threat, which 
is closely related to priming.  Stereotype threat occurs when “one fac-
es judgment based on societal stereotypes about one’s group.”81  
Awareness of the stereotype and the possibility of judgment based on 
 
 76 See FLORENCE L. DENMARK ET AL., ENGENDERING PSYCHOLOGY:  WOMEN AND GENDER 
REVISITED 245 (2d ed. 2005). 
 77 See DEBORAH L. TOLMAN, DILEMMAS OF DESIRE:  TEENAGE GIRLS TALK ABOUT SEXUALITY 
91 (2002). 
 78 See Rebecca E. Fromme & Catherine Emihovich, Boys Will Be Boys:  Young Males’ Perceptions 
of Women, Sexuality, and Prevention, 30 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 172, 174 (1998) (“[W]omen are 
divided into two categories:  good ones who are chaste, marriageable, and socially 
acceptable partners and bad ones who are sexual and unacceptable for marriage.”); Mary 
Beth Oliver & Constantine Sedikides, Effects of Sexual Permissiveness on Desirability of Partner 
as a Function of Low and High Commitment to Relationship, 55 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 321, 326 
(1992). 
 79 See Why kNOw?, supra note 4. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Steven J. Spencer et al., Stereotype Threat and Women’s Math Performance, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 4, 5 (1999). 
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the stereotype can actually cause a person to perform consistently with 
the stereotype.  For example, a common stereotype in the U.S. is that 
women perform poorly in math.82  Women who are reminded of this 
stereotype just before taking a math test will generally perform sub-
stantially worse than if they had not been “primed” with the stereo-
type.83  Men primed with the same stereotype may perform better 
than they otherwise would have.84  The same phenomenon has been 
observed to affect African-Americans taking standardized tests; white 
men taking math tests when primed with stereotypes about Asian 
math ability; men performing child care; and white men playing 
sports.85  The fact that everyone reading this Article can easily guess 
the effects of stereotype threat in each context demonstrates the per-
vasiveness of our cultural stereotypes as frames for understanding and 
even influencing individual performance. 
What happens, then, if sex education is right before math, and 
the sex education teacher promotes stereotypes about female and 
male aptitudes for analytical reasoning?  The research on stereotype 
threat suggests that priming students with sex stereotypes about their 
intellectual abilities could have a measurable effect on their grades. 
The literature on priming and stereotype threat suggests that it is 
highly possible that sex education programs like those described in 
Part I.A perpetuate gender role stereotypes and instill negative atti-
tudes toward sex.  Although this hypothesis is supported with pre-
vious research, further empirical research is needed.  Most studies of 
sex education programs focus on whether the programs “work” in the 
short term—meaning, do they successfully influence teens to delay 
sexual activity and/or practice safer sex?  Additional psychological re-
 
 82 See id. at 6 (citing studies documenting the existence of this stereotype). 
 83 Id. at 10–14; see also Toni Schmader, Gender Identification Moderates Stereotype Threat Effects 
on Women’s Math Performance, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 194 (2002) (finding that 
the degree of women’s gender identification affects their susceptibility to stereotype 
threat). 
 84 Spencer et al., supra note 81, at 13. 
 85 See Irwin Katz et al., Effects of Task Difficulty, Race of Administrator, and Instructions on Digit-
Symbol Performance of Negroes, 2 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53 (1965) (finding effects 
of the race of the test administrator on performance); Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aron-
son, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Task Performance of African Americans, 69 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995) (discussing stereotype threat and the perfor-
mance of African Americans on intellectual tests); Gregory M. Walton & Steven J. Spenc-
er, Latent Ability:  Grades and Test Scores Systematically Underestimate the Intellectual Ability of 
Negatively Stereotyped Students, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1132 (2009) (discussing stereotype threat 
and the performance of white men on math tests); Lawrence J. Stricker & Isaac I. Bejar, 
Test Difficulty and Stereotype Threat on the GRE General Test, (Educ. Testing Serv. Research 
Report 99-19, GRE Board Research Report No. 96-06R, 1999) (discussing stereotype 
threat and the performance of minority groups on standardized tests). 
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search could illuminate what effects curricular choices may have on 
an individual’s belief in gender-role stereotypes and the individual’s 
attitudes toward sex in general.  Previous research on priming and 
stereotypes suggests that those who undergo curricula slanted to-
wards sex biases would hold stronger beliefs in gender-role stereo-
types and more negative attitudes toward sex, as compared to those 
who receive accurate, non-stereotyped sex education. 
C.  Legal Challenges to Biased Sex Education 
Additional research would be useful from an educational perspec-
tive; it would also help to inform legal analysis of limits on stereo-
typed instruction in public schools.  For example, Part II.A, below, 
argues that classroom stereotyping in sex education constitutes a sex 
classification of the students for purposes of equal protection analysis.  
This argument stands on its own terms, but it deals with an unusual 
set of circumstances, since equal protection doctrine typically deals 
with more overt distribution of rights and benefits.  Empirical con-
firmation that express differentiation in instruction also has a diffe-
rentiated impact would demonstrate that the argument has more 
than formal significance. 
However, the legal status of biased sex education programming 
does not, for the most part, depend on empirical psychological evi-
dence.  Under the Establishment Clause, the government may not 
promote a particular religious belief, and it is no defense to argue 
that its promotional efforts were unsuccessful.  As we argue below, 
the same principle should apply to the promotion of sex stereotypes.86 
Lawyers and scholars have argued that the kinds of biases and mi-
sinformation described above violate the Constitution in several ways.  
Many of the same curricula that promote gender stereotypes may also 
unconstitutionally promote particular religious beliefs.  For example, 
the Sex Respect abstinence-only program received federal funds de-
spite its religious foundation.  This program instructs students to ab-
stain from sex until marriage and advises them to consult with their 
pastors and to pray for guidance as they work through this trying 
time.87  The Why kNOw? program also uses religious language and bib-
lical verses and stories in its abstinence-only curriculum.88  Why kNOw? 
also refers students to outside religious organizations which they may 
join and in which they may take a virginity pledge.  Within the virgini-
 
 86 See infra Part III.B. 
 87 See Sex Respect Review, supra note 35. 
 88 See Why kNOw?, supra note 4. 
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ty pledge, students are asked to commit to God, to themselves, to 
their family and friends, to their future mate, and to their future 
children that they will retain their virginity until the day in which they 
enter a “biblical marriage.”89  Unsurprisingly, the Establishment 
Clause has been a frequent basis for legal challenges to programs re-
ceiving federal funds earmarked for abstinence-only education.90 
In addition to Establishment Clause problems, some programs 
may be so dangerously inaccurate and misleading from a scientific 
perspective that they violate substantive due process, or they may vi-
olate substantive due process merely by seeking to intervene so deep-
ly in students’ intimate choices.91  A few lawsuits have challenged ab-
stinence-only programs under state laws requiring sex education to 
be accurate and/or neutral.92 
The First Amendment and due process problems with biased cur-
ricula are overlapping and intertwined with issues of gender stereo-
typing.  The commitment to rigid gender roles, for example, is likely 
due in large part to the religious beliefs that motivate many of the 
curricula.  The due process and religious aspects of the problem, 
however, have already been examined.93  The equal protection issue 
has received only passing commentary in legal scholarship.94  There-
fore, this Article carves out the issue of sex stereotypes and equal pro-
 
 89 See Why kNOw?, supra note 4. 
 90 See KAY, supra note 4, at 38–39. 
 91 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (holding that in-
formed consent requirements for abortion were consistent with the right to privacy, even 
when the government openly intends to influence the choice between abortion and 
childbirth, but suggesting that this holding was contingent on the accuracy of the infor-
mation presented).  See generally Sarah Smith Kuehnel, Note, Abstinence-Only Education 
Fails African American Youth, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1241 (2009); Naomi K. Seiler, Abstinence-
Only Education and Privacy, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 27 (2002). 
 92 See KAY, supra note 4, at 38–39.  
 93 See generally Julie Jones, Money, Sex, and the Religious Right:  A Constitutional Analysis of Feder-
ally Funded Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage Sexuality Education, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1075 
(2002) (arguing that section 510 of Title 5 of the Social Security Act violates the Estab-
lishment Clause); Naomi Rivkind Shatz, Unconstitutional Entanglements:  The Religious Right, 
the Federal Government, and Abstinence Education in the Schools, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 495 
(2008) (arguing that abstinence-only education is unconstitutional because of the inhe-
rently religious nature of the message); Gary J. Simson & Erika A. Sussman, Keeping the Sex 
in Sex Education:  The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses and the Sex Education Debate, 9 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 265 (2000) (considering the implications of the First 
Amendment’s Religion Clauses on both comprehensive and abstinence-only sex educa-
tion). 
 94 See sources cited supra note 12. 
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tection, treating that issue without regard to the religious overtones 
of the gender roles being promoted.95 
Sex bias in school curricula has been on feminist radar screens for 
many years.96  As a form of sex discrimination in education, it argua-
bly should have been addressed by Title IX of the Civil Rights Act.97  
However, when the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
promulgated regulations to implement Title IX in 1975, it created a 
loophole.  Over the objections of feminist organizations, the Depart-
ment declared that “[T]itle IX does not reach the use of textbooks 
and curricular materials on the basis of their portrayals of individuals 
in a stereotypic manner or on the basis that they otherwise project 
discrimination against persons on account of their sex.”98  The kind 
of curricular material described in Part I.A is thus exempt from the 
legal regime that is supposed to prevent sex discrimination in the 
schools. 
The explicit sex stereotyping in sex education classes first received 
widespread attention as a result of the Waxman Report.99  The report 
highlighted gender bias as a pervasive feature of many abstinence-
only programs.  As noted above, similar reports have been issued by 
Legal Momentum and SIECUS.100  In 2007, Cornelia Pillard brought 
this issue to the attention of the legal academy in a symposium at 
 
 95 In addition, the scope of this Article is limited to school districts’ curricular choices at the 
policy level.  Not addressed are students’ rights to engage in dissenting speech (see Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and Morse v. Frederick, 51 U.S. 393 
(2007)).  For a discussion on teachers’ intellectual and free speech rights, see generally 
Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 647–53 (1980) (reviewing the is-
sue of values inculcation in public schools primarily through the lens of identifying the 
appropriate degree of academic freedom to accord to teachers), and on censorship in 
school libraries, see generally Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 
457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
 96 See Beverly J. Hodgson, Sex, Texts, and the First Amendment, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 173, 175–79 
(1976) (surveying the literature on gender bias in curricular materials); Carol Amyx, 
Comment, Sex Discrimination:  The Textbook Case, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1312, 1312–14 (1974) 
(documenting the extent of sex-role stereotyping in public school textbooks); Tanya 
Neiman, Note, Teaching Woman Her Place:  The Role of Public Education in the Development of 
Sex Roles, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1207 (1973) (discussing the manner through which sex 
roles are imposed during the educational process). 
 97 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
 98 40 Fed. Reg. 24,135 (June 4, 1975).  The Department claimed that this exception to 
Title IX was motivated by unspecified First Amendment concerns.  Cf. Monteiro v. Tempe 
Union High Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that students have a 
First Amendment right of access to materials that have been deemed educationally valua-
ble by school authorities).  But see Hodgson, supra note 96 (refuting the First Amendment 
justification for the regulation). 
 99 Waxman Report, supra note 4. 
100 KAY, supra note 4; Curricula and Speaker Reviews, supra note 34.   
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Emory Law School.101  In addition to pointing to the possibility of a 
legal challenge to stereotyped programs, Pillard described the aims 
and strategies that ought to shape an egalitarian sex education curri-
culum.102  Susan Appleton has also recently described a vision of a 
feminist approach to sex education.103  These visions represent what a 
school system would do if it took seriously its own independent con-
stitutional obligation to provide the equal protection of the laws. 
It seems unlikely that many schools are currently teaching sex 
education in the way either Pillard or Appleton describes, or that a 
court would require them to do so.  Courts can, however, set outer 
limits on permissible instruction that implicates constitutional values.  
Pillard also suggested what this Article argues is the correct direction 
for developing doctrine in this area:  an analogy to the Establishment 
Clause, which forbids public schools to promote particular normative 
positions about religion.104 
Pillard’s article prompted a few efforts to elaborate the doctrinal 
basis for challenging sex stereotypes in sex education, most promi-
nently in an issue brief published by the American Constitution So-
ciety (ACS).105  These efforts overlooked Pillard’s suggestion of a con-
nection to Establishment Clause cases, relying on a pure Fourteenth 
Amendment approach.106  Their arguments thus lack the benefits of 
the insights developed from First Amendment case law and scholarly 
examination of the imposition of values on students in public 
schools.  Instead, they attempt a doctrinal shortcut that likely 
would—and should—prove fatal in court.107  Part II of this Article dis-
cusses the strengths and weaknesses of the equal protection ap-
proach, and Part III turns to the insights that can be gleaned from 
First Amendment theory. 
 
101 See Pillard, supra note 12. 
102 Id. at 959. 
103 Susan Frelich Appleton, Toward a “Culturally Cliterate” Family Law?, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER 
L. & JUST. 267 (2008). 
104 See Pillard, supra note 12, at 961 (“Teaching about sex-based discrimination, identifying 
historical patterns, and observing general trends is [sic] not the same thing as endorsing 
them.  For equal protection purposes, as under the religion clauses, the constitutional 
line should be drawn between descriptive teaching, and prescriptive or normative advo-
cacy of sexual double standards.”). 
105 ACS Brief, supra note 13; see also Greenblatt, supra note 7 (discussing legal challenges to 
federally-funded sex education programs); LeClair, supra note 12 (focusing on Title IX 
challenges to abstinence-only sex education but overlooking the regulatory loophole de-
scribed above). 
106 See ACS Brief, supra note 13, at 7–17; Greenblatt, supra note 7, at 13–19. 
107 See ACS Brief, supra note 13, at 11–13, discussed infra Part II.C.2. 
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II.  THE EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT 
The ACS Brief attacks the sex stereotypes found in sex education 
curricula with the usual doctrinal tools for challenging sex classifica-
tions based on stereotypes.108  The brief, however, does not grapple 
with an important limitation on the logic of existing doctrine:  the 
usual doctrinal moves for condemning stereotypes, even if they have 
a basis in fact, do not work in the curricular context.109  This limita-
tion motivates the effort in Part III to deepen the equal protection 
analysis by drawing on First Amendment precedents that deal with 
governmental efforts to promote particular ideologies. 
A.  Sex Classifications, Sex Stereotypes, and Gender Scripts 
For purposes of equal protection analysis, the first question is 
whether the state has adopted a sex classification at all.  Most sex 
education courses do not segregate children on the basis of sex, and 
children of both sexes are taught according to the same curriculum.  
The teacher could conduct most of the lessons without even inquir-
ing into the sex of any particular student.  There is, therefore, a co-
lorable argument that there is no facial sex classification. 
This argument may be correct with respect to certain kinds of bi-
ased curricula.  For example, a history curriculum that neglected the 
achievements of women might have different effects on female and 
male students but not, in all fairness, be considered a classification of 
the students themselves on the basis of sex.110  Such a curriculum 
would be facially neutral as to the students themselves, so it would vi-
olate the Equal Protection Clause only if it was adopted for the pur-
pose of discriminating against female students under the rigorous de-
finition of purpose adopted in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts 
v. Feeney.111 
In the case of the sex education lessons described above, however, 
the better argument is that they classify students by sex with respect 
to what the students are instructed about themselves and their aspira-
 
108 See ACS Brief, supra note 13, at 7–17. 
109 See infra Part III.C.2. 
110 Even the fairest possible curriculum would likely have different impacts on girls and boys, 
the blame for which lies much more with history than with any teacher’s presentation of 
it. 
111 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that a facially neutral statute that has a differential im-
pact on the basis of sex violates the Equal Protection Clause only if it is adopted “at least 
in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group”). 
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tions.  Sex education courses are expressly intended to instruct stu-
dents about how to live their own lives.  As Pillard argued, “the con-
duct-shaping purpose of sex education curricula makes them vulner-
able to equal protection challenge even if communicating 
retrogressive sex roles in traditional academic classes might not be.”112  
Unlike standard academic subjects, which are meant to teach stu-
dents about various aspects of the world, sex education openly aims 
to influence students’ aspirations and intimate choices about sexual 
activity and family relationships.  Moreover, most other subjects are, 
at least in theory, subject to the intellectual standards of a particular 
academic discipline.  While a sex education curriculum may include 
some biology, the stereotypes with which we are concerned appear 
largely in curricular components whose sole aim is the transmission 
of particular values to govern students’ intimate life choices.113  When 
a school elects to promote one set of values and aspirations for girls 
and a different set for boys, the fact that each group is present for the 
other’s lessons does not change the fact that the school has classified 
its students on the basis of sex.  As the ACS Brief points out, “such 
teaching indoctrinates female and male students with different mes-
sages about who they are.”114 
A collection of stereotypes that prescribes a particular life path or 
pattern of conduct on the basis of gender is called a gender script.115  
Common gender scripts in American culture maintain the sexual 
double standard and the gendered division of labor.116  Gender scripts 
 
112 Pillard, supra note 12, at 958. 
113 See ACS Brief, supra note 13, at 13.  To be sure, schools aim to promote values such as self-
discipline and responsibility through all their instruction.  The differences between in-
culcating those sorts of values and inculcating sex stereotypes is discussed infra 
Part III.A.1. 
114 ACS Brief, supra note 13, at 13.  The ACS Brief also argues that such teachings constitute 
sex classifications in a larger sense “comparable . . . to Congress passing a resolution” en-
dorsing gender stereotypes.  Id.  I am less certain that the latter type of governmental ac-
tion constitutes a sex classification for equal protection purposes.  Cf. NAACP v. Hunt, 
891 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that Alabama’s display of the confederate 
flag did not violate the Equal Protection Clause in part because “there is no unequal ap-
plication of the state policy; all citizens are exposed to the flag”).  For a discussion on the 
differences between government expression of racist ideas and government endorsement 
of sex stereotypes, see also infra Part II.D. 
115 Holning Lau, Identity Scripts and Democratic Deliberation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 897, 902–03 
(2010) (defining “identity scripts” as the products of aggregating stereotypes). 
116 See Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 28 (2010) (arguing 
that gender scripts maintain the traditional division of labor within marriage); Linda C. 
McClain, Some ABCs of Feminist Sex Education (In Light of the Sexuality Critique of Legal Femin-
ism), 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 63, 68–69 (2006) (discussing cultural scripts about sexual-
ity and the sexual double standard).   
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also define what behavior is seen as masculine or feminine.117  For ex-
ample, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court found sex 
discrimination when an employer failed to promote a female stock-
broker because she needed to “walk more femininely, talk more fe-
mininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry.”118  The Court recognized that the employer’s ex-
pectations placed the employee in a catch-22, since the qualities de-
manded of her because of gender clashed with the qualities expected 
in her traditionally male job.  This sort of sex discrimination claim 
under Title VII is known as a sex-stereotyping claim. 
Discrimination law under both Title VII and the Equal Protection 
Clause usually refers to “stereotypes” rather than “scripts.”  The con-
cept of gender scripts is useful, however, because it highlights the 
connections among individual stereotypes that together form a hie-
rarchal, gendered system. 
A stereotype may be merely a generalization, and it may be based 
on an empirical reality.  For example, when a state assumes that a 
married man supports his family financially but a married woman 
does not, this assumption is a stereotype even if it is based on an ac-
curate statistical observation.119  This understanding of stereotypes as 
generalizations runs throughout the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
of sex classifications, and it persists today.  For example, in a recent 
oral argument, Justice Scalia asked, “What separates a stereotype 
from a reality?”120  Justice Ginsburg responded, “[I]t is true in general, 
but there are people who don’t fit the mold.  So a stereotype is true 
for maybe the majority of cases.  It just means that you say:  This is the 
way women are, this is the way men are.”121  Justice Ginsburg’s com-
ment is a classic statement of the “unfair generalizations” definition 
of a stereotype. 
The unfairness of expecting outliers to conform to a statistical 
norm, however, is not the only problem with sex stereotypes.  Catha-
rine MacKinnon has suggested a more nuanced taxonomy of stereo-
types: 
 
117 Cameron Cloar, Through the Price Waterhouse-Looking Glass:  Dominance and Oppression 
Revealed, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 703, 709–10 (2009) (noting a discrimination plaintiff’s chal-
lenge to a “classic gender script” of femininity). 
118 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). 
119 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 461 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973) (plurality opinion) (hold-
ing that a classification on this basis violated the Due Process Clause even if the statutory 
presumption was statistically accurate). 
120 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Flores-Villar v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1878 (2010) 
(No. 09-5801).   
121 Id. 
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As an account of the injury of discrimination, this notion of misrepresen-
tation by generalization is certainly partial, limited, can be trivializing 
and even perverse.  What if the stereotype—such as women enjoy rape—
is not really true of anyone?  What if, to the extent a stereotype is accu-
rate, it is a product of abuse, like passivity, or a survival strategy, like ma-
nipulativeness?  What if, to the degree it is real, it signals an imposed re-
ality, like a woman’s place is in the home?  What if the stereotype is ideo-
ideologically injurious but materially helpful, like maternal preference in 
child custody cases?  What if a stereotype is injurious as a basis for policy 
whether or not accurate, such as the view that women are not interested 
in jobs with higher salaries?  Further, why is it an injury to be considered 
a member of a group of which one is, in fact, a member?  Is the injury 
perhaps more how that group is actually treated?122 
The concept of a gender script captures the prescriptive quality 
found in sex education curricula.  The curricula do not merely report 
a statistical reality or even assume that students’ lives will correspond 
to the statistics; instead, the curricula teach that students ought to 
conform to particular gender scripts. 
The classification of students by sex and their assignment to dif-
ferent, prescribed gender scripts puts the sex education curricula in a 
different category from previously litigated cases of curricular bias.  
In Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School District,123 for example, parents 
lost their case objecting to the assignment of Huckleberry Finn, despite 
evidence that race-based, student-to-student harassment had substan-
tially increased during and after the assignment.  The court viewed 
the assignment as a legitimate effort to teach literature, as well as an 
opportunity to teach about racism; it saw no reason to conclude that 
the school intended to promote the racist values expressed in the 
book.124  While cases such as Monteiro raise serious concerns about 
educational equality, the harm inflicted was likely unintentional—
brought about either by indifference to disproportionate racial im-
pact or by failed implementation of a legitimate pedagogical goal—
rather than an intentional and explicit endorsement of stereotypes.  
Doctrinally, the intentional differentiation in the lessons conveyed to 
girls and boys is subject to a more rigorous standard than the unin-
tentional differential effect in Monteiro.125  The blatant sex stereotyp-
 
122 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1293 
(1991). 
123 158 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998). 
124 On the question of whether Huckleberry Finn, taken as a whole, supports the ideology of 
white supremacy, see Sharon E. Rush, Emotional Segregation:  Huckleberry Finn in the Mod-
ern Classroom, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 305, 366 (2003). 
125 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278–81 (1979) (upholding a state’s pre-
ference for hiring veterans despite legislative indifference to its effect on female appli-
cants). 
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ing in many sex education curricula therefore offers a better starting 
point for judicial exploration of the problem of biased curricula than 
the more difficult project of interpreting the messages implicit in a 
work of literature. 
B. Intermediate Scrutiny and Real Differences 
Once it is established that students are being classified and treated 
differently on the basis of sex, the question becomes whether that 
classification is justified.  Sex classifications are subject to interme-
diate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause:  a sex classification 
must serve an “important” state interest, and that interest must be 
“substantially related” to the sex classification.126  Typically, the Su-
preme Court has concluded that a sex classification satisfies interme-
diate scrutiny when the classification is used in a way relevant to “real 
differences” between women and men.127  It has struck down sex clas-
sifications that it finds to be based not on real differences but on 
“archaic stereotypes.”128  Any equal protection challenge to biased 
 
126 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a gender-
based classification).  When the Court is feeling particularly hostile to a sex classification, 
it requires that the government’s justification for the classification be “exceedingly persu-
asive.”  United States v. Virginia (The VMI Case), 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (citing Miss. 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).  But see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 
53, 74, 79–80 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority had 
abandoned the “exceedingly persuasive” requirement). 
127 The “real differences” line of cases was first identified as such in Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking 
Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 962 (1984), and Ann E. Freedman, Sex 
Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913, 931 (1983).  Freedman and 
Law identified the following as “real differences” cases:  Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 
464 (1981) (upholding a statute defining statutory rape as a crime only when committed 
by a male against a female); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (concluding that male-
only registration for the draft is constitutional); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) 
(permitting the exclusion of women from contact jobs in prisons); Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 
U.S. 125 (1976) (finding that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from disabili-
ty benefits policy offered by private employer does not violate Title VII); Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (supporting the separate rules for male and female officers un-
der navy’s up-or-out policy); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that the 
exclusion of pregnancy from disability benefits policy offered by public employer is con-
stitutional); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (striking down mandato-
ry pregnancy leave rules as arbitrary and irrational). 
128 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 
U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1981); see, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 549–50 (1996) 
(rejecting arguments that gender differences in learning styles justified excluding women 
from quasi-military academy); see also Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Con-
demns”:  Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1447, 1449 (2000) (“To determine whether there is unconstitutional sex discrimina-
tion, one need generally ask only two questions:  1) Is the rule or practice at issue sex-
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curricula would therefore hinge on the court’s assessment of whether 
the gendered instruction in sex education classes fairly reflects real 
sex differences or improperly reflects or reinforces sex stereotypes. 
The categories “real differences” and “archaic stereotypes” are not 
mutually exclusive.  Reed v. Reed,129 the first Supreme Court case hold-
ing that a sex classification was unconstitutional, involved a classifica-
tion that was both archaic and, in a sense, real.  The state had 
adopted a presumption that male relatives of a decedent should be 
preferred as administrators of the estate.  The state probably could 
have shown that this classification was based on a “real difference” in 
that men typically had more experience than women with certain 
kinds of financial affairs.  The difference may have been “real” in the 
sense of being statistically accurate.  The Court nonetheless struck 
down the presumption as an impermissible generalization.  Since 
Reed, the Court has consistently rejected statistical arguments as justi-
fications for sex classifications.  The “real differences” that the Court 
has accepted are those the Court perceives to be immutably related 
to reproductive biology.130 
A state could identify several important interests served by its sex 
education curriculum, having to do with students’ education and wel-
fare.  Since the course revolves around sex and reproduction, biolog-
ical differences between females and males are directly implicated.  
The state would thus try to justify its gendered instruction by refer-
ence to the “real differences” line of cases. 
Of the “real differences” cases, the most obvious one for a state to 
rely on in support of gendered sex education instruction is Michael M. 
v. Superior Court.131  Michael M. upheld California’s statutory rape law, 
which made it a crime for an under-aged boy to have sex with an un-
 
respecting, that is to say, does it distinguish on its face between males and females?  and 
2) Does the sex-respecting rule rely on a stereotype?” (internal citation omitted)). 
129 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
130 See Freedman, supra note 119; Law, supra note 119; see also Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 
(“[T]his Court has consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification is not in-
vidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in 
certain circumstances.”).  The Court has also treated certain matters involving military 
service as if the exclusion of women from combat service was a real difference rather than 
a legally created one.  This treatment is probably an artifact of the cases, which never di-
rectly challenged the combat exclusion but dealt with its consequences.  In addition, 
many of the Justices likely believed that the exclusion was itself justified by real differenc-
es.  See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Contingent Equal Protection:  Reaching for Equality After Ricci 
and PICS, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 397, 436–37 (2010) (discussing the treatment of the 
military cases as “real differences” cases). 
131 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (permitting a statutory rape statute that treated men and wom-
en differently). 
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der-aged girl, but not vice versa.  The Supreme Court accepted Cali-
fornia’s argument that the purpose of the classification was to facili-
tate enforcement of the law which would, in turn, prevent teen preg-
nancy.132  Girls, the Court reasoned, suffer “natural sanctions” for sex 
by the risk of pregnancy.133  That risk is a “real difference,” so the state 
was entitled to treat girls and boys differently and thereby “roughly 
‘equalize’ the deterrents on the sexes.”134 
Pregnancy prevention is typically one of the goals of sex education 
courses, and it is likely that courts would reach for Michael M. if asked 
to assess the validity of sex differentiation in sex education.  For ex-
ample, a state could argue that emphasizing girls’ responsibility as 
sexual gatekeepers was for their own benefit because they would dis-
proportionately suffer the negative consequences of sexual activity.  
The statute upheld in Michael M. itself reflected stereotypes about 
who benefits and who is victimized by sex, which are similar to some 
of the stereotypes found in sex education curricula.  Nonetheless, 
once the Michael M. Court identified a link between the sex classifica-
tion and the state interest in pregnancy prevention, it showed little 
interest in the rest of the intermediate scrutiny analysis.  The Court 
was unswayed either by evidence that the classification served that 
state interest rather poorly or by claims that impermissible stereo-
types were the true basis for the law.135 
In recent years, however, the center of gravity in the Court’s anal-
ysis seems to have shifted further toward anti-stereotyping principles.  
As Cary Franklin has explained, “[i]n the past, ‘real’ differences 
served as a check on the reach of anti-stereotyping doctrine.”136  Thus, 
once the Michael M. Court had identified real differences, it no long-
er interrogated the law for stereotyping.  Under more recent cases, 
perhaps, “anti-stereotyping doctrine serves as a check on the state’s 
regulation of ‘real’ differences.”137  For example, in Nguyen v. INS,138 
the majority concluded that a statute distinguishing between mothers 
and fathers in the transmission of citizenship was based on real dif-
ferences but also appeared to concede that the law would nonethe-
 
132 Id. at 469–70. 
133 Id. at 473. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 472, n.7 (stating that possible invidious motives for the statute were irrelevant); id. 
at 474 n.9 (dismissing arguments that a gender-neutral statute would not hinder prosecu-
tions). 
136 Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 145 (2010). 
137 Id. at 145–46. 
138 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001). 
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less be invalid if it were based on stereotypes about those differences.  
Thus, even if a state can point to real differences like in Michael M., 
the current Supreme Court may nonetheless require that those dif-
ferences be addressed without perpetuating archaic stereotypes. 
Moreover, of all the objectionable sex stereotypes found in sex 
education curricula, only a small portion fall under the logic of Mi-
chael M.  While the Michael M. decision is flawed in several ways, its 
concept of real differences is, at least, limited to situations involving a 
plausible connection to reproductive biology.  Later cases have con-
firmed that “real differences” do not include purported sex differ-
ences in mental ability, learning style, or career ambitions.139  Moreo-
ver, the sex biases behind the statutory rape law were implicit and 
subtle, not like the explicit and blatant endorsement of traditional 
gender roles found in sex education curricula. 
Instructing students that wives give sex and husbands give money 
has no plausible connection to reproductive biology.  Telling girls 
that it is their responsibility to put the brakes on male lust by dressing 
modestly may resonate with some of the same stereotypes that were at 
play in Michael M., but it is much more readily recognized as such.  
The sex differences in sexual desire, intellectual ability, and life ex-
pectations that appear in sex education curricula are the sorts of cha-
racterizations of the sexes that the Court can be expected to deem 
not “real differences” but “archaic stereotypes.” 
While the Court has at times shown itself unable to distinguish be-
tween “biology [and] the social consequences of biology,”140 its un-
derstanding of which differences are “real” has narrowed over time.  
Once broad enough to include the capacity to be a lawyer as an inhe-
rently male trait,141 it is now limited to those differences that the 
Court believes have more direct links to reproductive organs.  More-
over, even the presence of real differences no longer necessarily di-
verts the Court from inquiring into whether the state has engaged in 
impermissible stereotyping.  The real differences argument would 
therefore not get the state very far in a challenge to gender-biased sex 
education.  On the other hand, however, for the reasons discussed in 
the next section, neither would the usual arguments about “stereo-
types” seal the case against the state’s curriculum. 
 
139 See United States v. Virginia (The VMI Case), 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (rejecting a classification 
based on purported sex differences in learning styles). 
140 Law, supra note 127, at 1001. 
141 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 142 (1872) (upholding the exclusion of 
women from the practice of law). 
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C.  Stereotypes Based on Fact 
Assuming that a court correctly identifies the stereotyped gender 
scripts being promoted in sex education, a state is likely to defend the 
teaching of some stereotypes on the grounds that they reflect empiri-
cal reality.  The argument would be that the state can legitimately in-
struct students about observed sex and gender differences, even if it 
cannot coercively impose those differences on individuals.  For ex-
ample, women and men perform differently on various tasks, may 
prefer different modes of reasoning, and express different priorities 
for their lives when it comes to sex, relationships, and careers.142  A 
state is likely to claim that its instruction about, say, women and 
men’s “five major needs in marriage” simply reflects this empirical 
reality. 
Just as culture provides gender scripts that represent appropriate, 
expected behavior for women and men, legal culture provides doc-
trinal scripts for particular areas of law.  A doctrinal script consists of 
a familiar, expected pattern of arguments with which lawyers and 
judges feel comfortable.  In law school, we teach students to frame 
their arguments within these scripts, using the established categories 
and vocabulary.  The structure of this Part so far follows the doctrinal 
script for equal protection:  First, is there a classification?; and 
second, what is the level of scrutiny?; and so forth.  At this point in 
the script, we have identified the state’s use of sex stereotypes, and 
the state has, we assume, responded by asserting a factual basis for the 
stereotypes in its curriculum. 
The equal protection script now calls for the plaintiff to cite cases 
like Reed v. Reed143 and United States v. Virginia (The VMI Case)144 for the 
proposition that the factual basis—the truth or falsity—of a stereo-
type is constitutionally irrelevant.  That is what the ACS Brief does,145 
and that is where its argument goes off the rails.  By making this ar-
gument, the brief implicitly concedes that the Equal Protection 
Clause could be used to prohibit a school from conveying truthful in-
formation because that information was inconsistent with a particular 
theory of sex equality.  While the authors of the brief clearly do not 
intend such a result, the implication follows from their mechanical 
 
142 See generally Doreen Kimura, Sex Differences in the Brain, 267 SCI. AM.188 (1992). 
143 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a preference for men as administrators of estates). 
144 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (the VMI case) (striking down the male-only admissions policy of a 
state-sponsored quasi-military college). 
145 ACS Brief, supra note 13, at 11–13 (“The Constitutional Irrelevance of Evidence of a Ste-
reotype’s ‘Accuracy’”). 
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application of the precedents on stereotyping.  The brief errs by im-
plying that the issue to be addressed is whether sex education curri-
cula teach the truth about sex differences as a matter of objective re-
ality rather than whether they are normatively promoting a gender 
ideology that is inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. 
To be clear, we are not arguing that the stereotypes described in 
Part I are fundamentally “true,” only that states are likely to argue 
that many of the generalizations have a statistical and perhaps biolog-
ical basis.  Confronting that argument, the ACS Brief attempts a doc-
trinal shortcut based on holdings in other contexts.  This shortcut is 
not appropriate in a challenge to curricular content. 
1.  Existing Doctrine on Entrenchment of Sex Stereotypes 
As discussed above in connection with real differences, the Su-
preme Court has frequently cited “archaic stereotypes” as the hall-
mark of unconstitutional sex classifications.146  For example, in Frontie-
ro v. Richardson,147 the Court struck down a military policy of paying a 
dependency allowance to all married servicemen, while married ser-
vicewomen received the allowance only on a showing that their hus-
bands were in fact dependent.  The classification corresponded to a 
statistical reality:  husbands were more likely than wives to have their 
own incomes.148  That statistical fact, however, is a far cry from the 
“real differences” in cases like Michael M., and the Court held it was 
an impermissible basis for determining individual entitlements.  Al-
though legislatures are entitled to take into account the basic facts of 
reproductive biology, they may not entrench gender roles pertaining 
to other characteristics, even when their classifications mirror exist-
ing statistical differences.149 
 
146 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (“Care must be taken in 
ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic no-
tions.”); Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1981). 
147 461 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).  Frontiero was decided before the Supreme Court 
formally adopted “intermediate scrutiny” for sex classifications, but the plurality’s reason-
ing is consistent with the Court’s subsequent treatment of stereotypes with a basis in fact. 
148 Id. at 688–89.  It was unclear whether the cost of identifying the exceptional cases would 
outweigh the costs of giving the benefit to men automatically.  Id. at 689–90. 
149 See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (stating that statistical differences in traf-
fic accidents could not justify a sex classification with respect to purchasing alcohol); 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (holding that the state could not assign the pow-
er to administer estates by assuming that men have more experience managing money 
than women do). 
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This principle has been especially important in the Supreme 
Court’s cases on single-sex education.150  Those cases may be particu-
larly relevant to sex education, since our premise is that girls and boys 
are receiving distinct educations, albeit in the same classrooms.  In 
The VMI Case, the Court was confronted with claims about sex differ-
ences very similar to some of the claims made in sex education curri-
cula; for example, girls and women value relationships, while boys 
and men value competitive achievement.151  These differences were 
offered to justify a male-only quasi-military academy based on an ad-
versative pedagogical model and a female-only leadership institute 
based on cooperation and reinforcement of self-esteem.152  As it has 
done since the 1970s, the Court rejected the sex classification be-
cause of its “overbroad generalization” and resonance with “stereo-
types,” even though the “stereotypes” have a statistical correlation 
with reality.153 
2.  A Tempting Misapplication 
The ACS issue brief seizes on this line of precedent as a rejoinder 
to any argument that the stereotypes in sex education curricula are 
permissible because they have a basis in fact.154  This rejoinder seeks 
to use cases like The VMI Case to rule out any defense of curricular 
material on the basis of truth, statistical accuracy, or empirical basis.  
Lessons that perpetuate gender stereotypes are impermissible even if 
the stereotype is, in fact, true.  This argument is understandably 
tempting, but it also has serious problems. 
The argument is tempting, first and foremost, because it is part of 
the doctrinal script of equal protection.  Deviating from a prescribed 
script requires extra work to explain and justify the deviation.155  In 
this instance, we can identify what that work would be by noting the 
alternative arguments for responding to a claim that curricular ste-
reotypes have a factual basis.  One alternative response would be to 
 
150 See United States v. Virginia (The VMI Case), 518 U.S. 515, 541, 558 (1996); Miss. Univ. for 
Women, 458 U.S. at 729, 733 (holding that Mississippi University for Women could not ex-
clude men from its nursing school even though women were more likely than men to 
pursue nursing degrees). 
151 The VMI Case, 518 U.S. at 541 (noting that Virginia had concluded that men were more 
likely to thrive in an adversarial environment, while women would do better in a more 
cooperative setting); Waxman Report, supra note 4, at 16. 
152 The VMI Case, 518 U.S. at 541. 
153 Id. at 533. 
154 ACS Brief, supra note 13, at 13–15. 
155 Cf. Lau, supra note 115, at 904–06 (describing the work involved in rejecting an ascribed 
identity script). 
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refute the factual claim.  That would require an evidentiary trial as 
well as a definition of truth when it comes to gender differences.156 
Another alternative would be to distinguish between factual 
statements, which can coherently be described as true or false, and 
the normative prescriptions contained in archaic gender scripts.  
Questions of truth, falsity, and normativity are discussed further be-
low.  At the outset, however, it is important to see that both alterna-
tive responses involve relatively novel arguments in the equal protec-
tion context.  They therefore require extra work, and in litigation, 
they would entail extra risk.  That is why it is tempting to stick to the 
doctrinal script and dismiss the question of factual accuracy as irrele-
vant.  For two reasons, however, this move is a mistake. 
First, the use of this argument—the fact that feminists arguing 
against the teaching of sex stereotypes find it necessary to make this 
argument—implies that the goal is to use equal protection doctrine 
to suppress the teaching of material that is factually true.  This should 
be disturbing.  It would certainly be disturbing to a federal court.  
There is a difference between, on the one hand, adopting laws that 
force individuals to conform to general statistics about group charac-
teristics and, on the other hand, describing those group characteris-
tics in the classroom.  Justice Ginsburg wrote in The VMI Case that dif-
ferences between the sexes “remain cause for celebration” so long as 
they are not used “to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and eco-
nomic inferiority of women.”157  More recently, as quoted above, she 
has stated that her definition of a stereotype is that it is “true in gen-
eral, but there are people who don’t fit the mold.”158  Rather than ac-
cepting the premise that the objectionable material is fact-based and 
responding in those terms, the appropriate response is that the state 
is not teaching facts.  It is prescribing sex roles to students by incul-
cating them with stereotyped gender scripts.  The short-cut of ar-
guing that it does not matter if it is “true” is tempting, but wrong. 
Second, feminists must confront a conflict that was submerged in 
The VMI Case.  When the State of Virginia sought to justify its stereo-
 
156 Is a statement about a sex difference “true” only if it is shown to have a biological basis?  
157 The VMI Case, 518 U.S. at 533–34.  The scope of the presumed “inherent differences” is 
unclear.  The context suggests that the phrase could refer only to gross anatomy.  On the 
other hand, Justice Ginsburg’s use of scare quotes around the phrase suggests that it may 
include widely observed statistical differences whether or not they are “real” in the sense 
of being aspects of reproductive biology.  Moreover, it seems unlikely that one would cel-
ebrate the mere fact of sexual reproduction and associated dimorphisms, impressive as 
they may be as evolutionary strategies. 
158 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Flores-Villar v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1878 (2010) 
(No. 09-5801).   
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typed treatment of women and men, it relied on reputable expert tes-
timony to do so.159  Much of the literature on sex differences in learn-
ing comes from the feminist movement, especially the “cultural” or 
“relational” branch of feminism.  Feminists have produced a vast 
amount of research about a range of sex differences, many of which 
correlate to the segregated education programs in The VMI Case and 
to some of the stereotypes promulgated in sex education curricula.160  
While some curricula have been mocked for promoting a Men Are 
From Mars, Women Are From Venus161 vision of sex differences, that vi-
sion is in some ways merely a less sophisticated version of psychologi-
cal theories accepted by many researchers, including feminist ones.  
While perhaps rejected by the majority of legal scholars, they are well 
within the range of reasonable disagreement.162 
The Supreme Court has rejected the use of most stereotypes as a 
basis for social policy.  For example, it is a fact in the United States 
that boys score better than girls on measures of mathematical ability.  
The state may not use that fact to restrict opportunities for girls, as a 
class, to study math.  But suppose that in a psychology class, students 
are instructed to the effect that “boys tend to do better than girls at 
math.”  That is a stereotype.  It is also true.163  We may prefer that it 
not be presented to students as a bare fact, and that it be contextua-
lized with the weighty evidence that the gap in math scores is the 
product of culture rather than inherent sex differences.164  A good 
teacher would feel compelled to present that context, as a matter of 
 
159 United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434–35 (W.D. Va. 1991) (“Given these deve-
lopmental differences females and males characteristically learn differently.  Males tend 
to need an atmosphere of adversativeness or ritual combat in which the teacher is a dis-
ciplinarian and a worthy competitor.  Females tend to thrive in a cooperative atmosphere 
in which the teacher is emotionally connected with the students.”). 
160 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:  PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT (6th ed. 1993) (proposing a theory of differential moral development on 
the basis of gender); DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON’T UNDERSTAND:  WOMEN AND MEN 
IN CONVERSATION (1990) (describing sex-based differences in communication styles). 
161 See WAIT Training Review, supra note 40 (noting that the program draws directly from 
JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS:  THE CLASSIC GUIDE TO 
UNDERSTANDING THE OPPOSITE SEX (2004)). 
162 For a critique of relational feminist psychology from a feminist legal perspective, see Pa-
mela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice:  Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, 
and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 858 (1993). 
163 Brian A. Nosek et al., National Differences in Gender-Science Stereotypes Predict National Sex Dif-
ferences in Science and Math Achievement, 106 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 
10,593 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/106/26/10593.full?sid
=959d961d-9d9e-4ebf-ab1e-add72a84d6d7. 
164 Id. 
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both her intellectual integrity and her obligations under the Equal 
Protection Clause (in that order). 
A similar analysis applies to stereotypes about women being better 
at connecting to others and expressing their feelings.  Most feminists 
attribute the statistical gap with respect to this ability to socialization, 
but some attribute it to social experiences that are closely intertwined 
with female biology:  childbirth, breastfeeding, penetration, and even 
menstruation.165  The latter analysis suggests that this particular sex 
difference is innate in female physiology.  Again, a good teacher 
would, at a minimum, present alternative viewpoints, but it does not 
follow that a school system should be found in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment for informing its students of a statistical finding, 
or of reputable psychological theory that attributes that finding to 
inherent sex differences. 
The point here is not that we should be content to let public 
schools promulgate stereotypes because they are arguably true any-
way.  It is that to the extent that a school conveys a fact to students, 
that fact’s correspondence to an objectionable stereotype does not 
constitute an equal protection violation.  The attempt in the ACS is-
sue brief to use existing precedent to argue that it does is severely 
flawed.  It wrenches the Supreme Court’s statements about sex ste-
reotypes out of context.  The argument that federal courts should 
suppress information “even if it’s true” because it is inconsistent with 
a particular theory of gender—even a theory of gender that is cur-
rently enshrined in constitutional doctrine—is a lightening rod of 
which federal courts would rightly steer clear. 
Most importantly, the argument is also flawed because it is beside 
the point.  The feminist objection to the stereotypes in sex education 
is not a matter of wanting to deny true facts, as invocation of the “even 
if it’s true” argument unfortunately suggests.  The objection is to the 
inculcation of sexist values by indoctrinating students with stereo-
typed gender scripts.  A dispute over factual accuracy or inaccuracy 
would be a red herring; the relevant dispute is not factual but norma-
tive.  The “even if it’s true” argument is a tempting short-cut but is 
both untenable and inapplicable. 
The fact that the dispute concerns not facts but normative prefe-
rences is part of why First Amendment, Establishment Clause con-
cepts are useful here.  Equal protection doctrine is structured around 
several assumptions regarding stereotypes.  It accepts that stereotypes 
are often true for most people.  It assumes that the problem is when 
 
165 See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988). 
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unfair generalizations are applied to unusual individuals who do not 
conform to type.  Implicit in this framework is the assumption that 
the individual is fully formed before the government’s classification is 
brought to bear.  In contrast, in First Amendment cases, courts rec-
ognize that the individual is still being formed and that the govern-
ment’s efforts to shape preferences are suspect, at least in constitu-
tionally sensitive territory.  Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
focuses on whether the government is imposing an impermissible 
normative script rather than on whether it is making an unfair gene-
ralization.  While the inclusion of false statements of fact might be 
further evidence that a particular normative agenda is being pur-
sued,166 it is the agenda, not the supporting facts, that is in question. 
Equal protection doctrine also fails to provide a clear answer to 
the question of why the state ought not to be allowed to disagree with 
the Supreme Court.  More precisely, I would submit that state actors 
are free to disagree with the Supreme Court about the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause, and First Amendment concepts are better 
suited to explaining why that disagreement should not be allowed to 
extend to classroom instruction.  The government may believe that 
the world would be a better place if more people adhered to the 
“traditional” sexual division of labor with regard to work and family.  
Government can further that vision in a variety ways, such as, say, fail-
ing to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act167 or issuing press re-
leases that endorse traditional marriages.168  Government cannot fur-
ther its vision by coercing individuals, such as by forbidding paid 
employment by mothers.  Somewhere between these two extremes, 
the government furthers its vision by instructing school children that 
they will be happier and the world will be a better place if they adopt 
the government’s vision as their own.  What is at issue is not whether 
particular observations about the sexes are “true” or “stereotypes” or 
both.  The fight is over whether they are desirable normative aspira-
tions.  The child here is presumed to be an empty or, at most, a par-
tially written-on page.  The adults are competing to write the story, 
 
166 False statements of fact may also support a claim for violation of the Due Process Clause.  
See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
167 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2006). 
168 Mary Anne Case, however, would argue that the press release is a violation.  See Mary 
Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between Government and Family Responsi-
bility for Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 381, 391 (arguing that a local government resolution 
endorsing “traditional family structure” could be understood to endorse traditional 
gender roles in marriage and that the implicit message “‘Welcome to Cobb County, 
Where a Woman’s Place Is in the Home’ would be a combination welcome mat and no 
trespassing sign with . . . serious constitutional problems”). 
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and compulsory schooling is a very big pen.  It is that normative 
struggle, not the truth or falsity of particular underlying facts, that is 
at issue in sex education stereotyping.  The argument against a ste-
reotype “even if it’s true” would be a detrimental distraction in any 
litigation over the sex stereotypes in sex education curricula. 
D.  Stereotypes and Brown v. Board of Education 
A final alternative to relying on the cases rejecting sex stereotypes 
would be to analogize to race cases, especially Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion169 and Loving v. Virginia.170  This argument is an improvement over 
“even if it’s true.”  However, sex classifications are different from race 
classifications in important, relevant ways that make this argument 
incomplete as well. 
The opinions in both Brown and Loving emphasized the govern-
ment’s policy of white supremacy as a hallmark of unconstitutionali-
ty.171  In Brown, the resulting stigmatic harm was part of what ren-
dered separate school systems inherently unequal.172  In Loving, the 
Court deployed the state’s supremacist ideology to counter the “equal 
application” argument that a ban on interracial marriage should be 
reviewed deferentially as long as it was applied to all races.173  Under 
the antisubordination theory of the Equal Protection Clause, an un-
derlying ideology of white supremacy, rather than the bare fact of a 
racial classification, should be the touchstone of equal protection 
analysis.174 
Sex stereotypes generally play the same role as white supremacy in 
the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis.  As Mary Anne Case 
has observed, the results of most sex cases turn not on the “fit” of the 
sex classification but on whether the Court perceives the state action 
as based on stereotypes.175  She points out that the outcomes of sex 
cases can be explained by asking whether the law in question in each 
case relies on a stereotype:  if it does, the law will be struck down.176  
 
169 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
170 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
171 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 (describing the stigmatic harm of segregated schooling); see 
also Loving, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (finding unconstitutional Virginia miscegenation 
laws found to have been designed to maintain White Supremacy). 
172 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95. 
173 Loving, 388 U.S. at 7–8. 
174 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976) 
(setting out the now-classic distinction between the anti-classification and anti-
subordination interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause). 
175 See Case, supra note 128, at 1449. 
176 See id. 
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Because courts have suggested that curricular promotion of white su-
premacy would be unconstitutional,177 and because stereotypes play 
the role in sex discrimination analysis that white supremacy plays in 
race discrimination analysis, it is again tempting to conclude that 
promotion of sex stereotypes in schools is similarly unconstitutional. 
In the Supreme Court’s eyes, however, there remains a key differ-
ence between race-based and sex-based laws:  white supremacy is a 
constitutional evil; sex differences are an impermissible basis for li-
miting individual opportunities but can otherwise be “cause for cele-
bration.”178  After all, sex differences are “true in general” and be-
come problematic only when they are imposed on individuals “who 
don’t fit the mold.”179  The sex cases downplay the relationship be-
tween stereotypes and hierarchy.180  In the absence of complete con-
demnation of sex stereotypes comparable to the condemnation of 
white supremacy, a school board can more plausibly argue that it is 
entitled to disagree with the Supreme Court’s vision of a good society 
with regard to gender roles.  A First Amendment approach, however, 
can provide the missing link to explain why that disagreement may 
not extend into the classroom. 
III.  A FIRST AMENDMENT OVERLAY 
This Part turns to the First Amendment, where concerns about 
governmental imposition of values are more deeply theorized and 
more elaborated in doctrine than under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  Part III.A reviews the scholarly literature on the values-
inculcating function of public schools.  It traces a progression from 
the most ambitious theoretical challenges to public schools as ve-
hicles of indoctrination to the Supreme Court’s much narrower ap-
proach.  Part III.B identifies the problem of stereotypes in sex educa-
tion as an appropriate next step in the Supreme Court’s cautious 
program of limiting the imposition of values.  This step would also 
 
177 See Monteiro v. Temple Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1027–32 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting a challenge to the assignment of Huckleberry Finn but distinguishing that chal-
lenge from the possibility of allegations “that the curriculum was itself racist or that the 
manner in which the assigned books, or any other books, were taught caused injury to 
African-American students”). 
178 The VMI Case, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
179 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Flores-Villar v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 1878 (2010) 
(No. 09-5801). 
180 This does not mean they ignore it entirely.  See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 133 
(1994) (noting that archaic stereotypes associated with “‘romantic paternalism’ . . . put 
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage”) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
684 (1973) (plurality opinion)). 
Mar. 2011] TEACHING VALUES, TEACHING STEREOTYPES 627 
 
bring the Court one step closer to grappling with the larger questions 
raised by the scholarly literature. 
A. Scholarly Literature on Inculcating Values 
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence limits 
one small aspect of public school efforts to instill selected values in 
children.  Since the 1960s, legal scholars have questioned and pro-
posed further limits on the use of public schools as vehicles for the 
government to mold citizens’ most basic values. 
1.  The Inevitability of Imposing Values on Students 
The first important observation of this literature is that the incul-
cation of values is inherent in schooling.  Cornelia Pillard’s article on 
sex education pointed out the inevitability of addressing gender ste-
reotypes, one way or the other, once a school decides to teach sex 
education.181  A similar point can be made more broadly about the 
enterprise of education itself: 
Even when a school bends over backwards (as it almost never does) to 
provide all points of view about ideas and issues in the classroom, it bare-
ly scratches the surface of its system of value inculcation.  A school must 
still confront its hidden curriculum—the role models teachers provide, the 
structure of classrooms and of teacher-student relationships, the way in 
which the school is governed, the ways in which the child’s time is par-
celed out, learning subdivided and fragmented, attitudes and behaviors 
rewarded and punished.182 
Just as the child is “the Achilles heel of liberal ideology,”183 public 
schooling presents the paradox that “[s]ociety must indoctrinate 
children so they may be capable of autonomy.”184  Even to strive for 
 
181 See Pillard, supra note 12, at 952. 
182 Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Consciousness:  A First Amend-
ment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 316–17 (1980) (emphasis add-
ed); see also Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship:  The Conflict Between Authority and 
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1649 (1986) (“Socialization to val-
ues through a uniform educational experience necessarily conflicts with freedom of 
choice and the diversity of a pluralistic society.”); Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, 
What Did You Learn In School Today?  Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-
Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 69 (2002) (“It would be both practically and 
theoretically impossible to completely prevent the governmental values inculcation that 
occurs in the educational process; in certain instances, values inculcation is an inherent 
by-product of the educational process, and it would be absurd to hypothesize a vibrant 
democratic society absent such a process.”). 
183 Shiffrin, supra note 95, at 647. 
184 Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the “Pall of Orthodoxy”:  Value Training in the 
Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 19 (1987). 
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value-neutrality in the schools may represent a bias in favor of a “lib-
eral scientific viewpoint” that values exposure to a wide variety of 
perspectives.185 
The child is inevitably coerced, placed in an environment which is mani-
pulated by those around him and which is bound to affect his attitudes as 
an adult.  The question is simply who (or more accurately, what combina-
tion of actors) should decide what values will be inculcated and how they 
should be instilled.186 
Because public school instruction necessarily contains a hidden 
curriculum based on the school’s values, students whose own values 
clash with the school’s values may struggle with the educational expe-
rience.187  The only currently available remedy for a clash between in-
dividual and school values is to opt out of public schooling, a remedy 
which requires the individual to have substantial resources for obtain-
ing private or home-based instruction.188  A child also needs a parent’s 
cooperation to pursue these alternatives. 
2. General Attempts to Limit the Imposition of Values on Public School 
Students 
Scholars vary in the degree to which they are troubled by the in-
evitability of values inculcation in public schools.  Arons and Law-
rence argue that governmental regulation of belief formation renders 
freedom of expression illusory, since “fewer people can conceive dis-
senting ideas.”189  They conclude that freedom of personal conscience 
requires that the individual control her own education, or that her 
parents do so if she is too young.190  To attack the problem of the 
“hidden curriculum,” they propose greater parental choice, decentra-
lized control of schools, abolition of standardized testing, and teacher 
training programs about the dangers of imposing values on students.  
Other scholars, however, point out that parental control presents its 
own problems.  Parents who home-school their children have far 
more ability than a school does to control the child’s entire environ-
ment and thereby indoctrinate a narrow, often sexist, ideology.  Sev-
eral scholars have proposed placing limits on the prerogatives of 
 
185 See id. at 28 (“[V]alue neutrality itself has a value bias favoring the liberal philosophy that 
the scientific method of inquiry embodies.”). 
186 Malcolm Stewart, The First Amendment, the Public Schools, and the Inculcation of Community 
Values, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 23, 25 (1989). 
187 See Arons & Lawrence, supra note 182, at 322 (arguing that the student who struggles in 
this manner will likely receive less educational benefit than others). 
188 See id. at 324. 
189 Id. at 312 . 
190 See id. at 313. 
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home and private schools in order to protect constitutional values.191  
Martha Fineman has suggested that protection of the child’s interests 
may require mandatory public schooling.192  The question, again, is 
what balance to strike among the competing claims of the parents, 
the state, and others to influence the child’s development. 
Most scholars take the basic structure of public schooling as given 
and concede, at least implicitly, the inevitability of values imposition 
through the hidden curriculum.  They turn, then, to seeking limits 
on more explicit advocacy of values, especially values that are contro-
versial.  Their approaches fall into four overlapping categories:  (1) 
relying on structural features of the schools to create an adequate 
marketplace of ideas within the classroom; (2) requiring “fairness” in 
the presentation of controversial topics to students; (3) defining spe-
cific values that may be promoted in public schools; and (4) defining 
specific values that may not be promoted in public schools.  The first 
three are described below.  The fourth, which is the approach taken 
in Supreme Court decisions, is discussed separately in the next Sub-
section. 
As an initial matter, the free speech rights of students and teach-
ers constitute a structural check on values imposition:  the normative 
assertions of the school itself can to some extent be challenged in 
classroom discussion.193  Many scholars, however, conclude that this 
check is insufficient and seek more substantive limits.  They question 
whether values inculcation is ever a proper goal of public schools at 
all.194  While recognizing the futility of eliminating values from the 
hidden curriculum, they seek to keep values imposition to a mini-
 
191 See, e.g., Kimberly Yuracko, Education Off the Grid:  Constitutional Constraints on Home-
Schooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (2008). 
192 Martha Albertson Fineman, Taking Children’s Interests Seriously, in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR 
CHILDREN:  THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 237 (Martha 
Albertson Fineman & Karen Worthington eds., 2009).  But see DAVID L. KIRP, MARK G. 
YUDOF, & MARLENE STRONG FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE 122–23 (1986) (summarizing the 
Supreme Court’s holdings regarding parents’ control over education thus:  “Even though 
a pluralist order in which individuals determine their life plans only after exposure to al-
ternative conceptions might be theoretically preferable to a world replete with private in-
doctrination, the Court has been unwilling to insist upon such exposure”). 
193 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (explaining that 
public schools lack complete authority over students’ classroom expressions due to stu-
dents’ fundamental rights).  But see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (explaining 
that students are subject to reduced First Amendment protections in the public school 
setting, as schools can restrict student expressions reasonably regarded as promoting il-
legal drug use). 
194 Frederick F. Schauer, School Books, Lesson Plans, and the Constitution, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 287, 
300–01 (1976) (collecting articles taking various positions on whether inculcation is a le-
gitimate goal). 
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mum by requiring the school to give “equal time” to competing view-
points on explicit questions of values.  Several of these scholars have 
proposed a “fairness doctrine” for public schools, sometimes express-
ly analogizing to the fairness doctrine that used to govern broadcast 
media.195 
The fairness approach has several limitations.  Courts would need 
to develop a method for identifying “controversial” issues and eva-
luating fairness, although presumably much of this work has been 
done in the broadcast context.196  The fairness approach may optimis-
tically assume too much about young childr0en’s capacity to partici-
pate as sophisticated “buyers” in the marketplace of ideas, especially 
when methods of instruction play to their emotions rather than their 
intellects.197 
In the hands of at least some scholars, the fairness approach may 
also result in excessive leniency with respect to the hidden curricu-
lum or else an overly narrow conception of the mission of a public 
school.  Fairness rules only apply to explicit discussions of controver-
sial topics, not to transmission of values that is inherent in the educa-
tional process.  For example, Martin Redish and Kevin Finnerty seek 
to “separate inherent values education from naked values inculca-
tion.”198  To do so, they propose a high level of deference to values 
imposition that occurs incident to substantive instruction.199  They re-
serve their skepticism for extra-curricular activities or programs about 
“normative issue[s] of concern primarily beyond the four walls of the 
schoolhouse.”200  In the latter category they place issues of “racial or 
gender equality, ethnic tolerance, [and] patriotism.”201  They object 
especially to events such as school assemblies promoting diversity, 
which they deem extra-curricular, but would give wide latitude to a 
 
195 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism:  The Constitutionality of “Bending” History 
in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 497 (1987); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First 
Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979); Tyll van 
Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. 
L. REV. 197 (1983). 
196 See generally Sheldon H. Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching:  The 
Scope of Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1479, 1509–14 (1972) (discussing the difficulties 
of a balance requirement). 
197 See Brent T. White, Ritual, Emotion, and Political Belief:  The Search for the Constitutional Limit 
to Patriotic Education in Public Schools, 43 GA. L. REV. 447, 449–51 (2009). 
198 See Redish & Finnerty, supra note 182, at 94 (emphasis removed). 
199 For example, they argue, “[I]f the school teaches a course in the Holocaust, the anti-
indoctrination model would not preclude the direct or indirect transmission of the value 
of religious tolerance.  The same would be true of a course in the history of race rela-
tions.”  Id. at 107. 
200 See id. at 70. 
201 See id. 
Mar. 2011] TEACHING VALUES, TEACHING STEREOTYPES 631 
 
school that inculcated the same values in the context of a history class 
on the Holocaust or the civil rights movement.202 
The example of sex education illustrates some of the shortcom-
ings of this approach.  The characterization of race and sex equality 
as issues that are “primarily” relevant outside of the school suggests a 
perspective that is quite removed from that of the child.  For the 
child, school is likely the main contact with the larger world, and her 
education may be strongly affected by issues of racial and gender 
equality, both within the school itself and from without.  Similarly, 
the dichotomy between values incident to the educational process 
and “extra-curricular” promotion of values rests on an assumption 
that curricular materials constitute instruction in particular academic 
disciplines.  Sex education, as taught in public schools, is not a dis-
tinct field of intellectual inquiry; it is primarily about shaping stu-
dents’ values.  This kind of instruction frustrates the attempt to “sepa-
rate inherent values education from naked values inculcation.”203 
Perhaps, then, the entire endeavor of values-shaping sex educa-
tion is illegitimate, regardless of which particular values inform it.  
That is certainly a tenable position, but it leads to a final problem 
with the fairness approach, at least as a practical solution to the prob-
lem of values imposition.  That problem is that both the American 
public and the Supreme Court appear to be committed to values in-
struction not just as a permissible but as a core function of public 
schools.  The Court has endorsed values inculcation through schools 
not just with regard to values like hard work and responsibility, which 
might be deemed part of the (legitimate) hidden curriculum, but al-
so with regard to more political values such as patriotism and racial 
equality.204  As a society, we want the schools to teach, for example, 
that Brown was right, and we do not want white supremacists to feel 
particularly welcome.  As a result, the scholarly critiques about the 
 
202 See id. 
203 Id. at 94 (emphasis omitted). 
204 See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–80 (1979) (quoting, inter alia, Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (“The Nation’s schools strive to teach that our strength comes from 
people of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of 
all.”); id. at 840 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is a democratic element:  an interest in 
producing an educational environment that reflects the ‘pluralistic society’ in which our 
children will live.  It is an interest in helping our children learn to work and play together 
with children of different racial backgrounds.  It is an interest in teaching children to en-
gage in the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to make a 
land of 300 million people one Nation.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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inherent perniciousness of values imposition have made virtually no 
headway in legal doctrine or either popular or judicial sentiment. 
Other scholars, however, embrace the task of identifying a set of 
“core” or “fundamental” values that schools may properly strive to in-
culcate in their students.  As justification, Steven Shiffrin has sug-
gested, 
Arguably, the system can be explained in terms of community rights.  Al-
though parents raise their children in the home, the community has a 
stake in the kind of person who will be a part of it, and that stake tran-
scends its interest in discouraging the production of Charlie Mansons, 
David Berkowitzs and Lee Harvey Oswalds.  For example, our society has 
constitutionalized some basic conceptions of equality, freedom, and po-
litical democracy.  It has a stake in seeing that its citizens are at least ex-
posed to its point of view.205 
The rub, of course, lies in identifying the community’s shared values.  
Shiffrin proposes “equality, freedom, and political democracy.”206  
Other scholars, however, have different lists.  Joel Moskowitz argues 
that schools should teach “‘such universally accepted values as justice, 
property rights, respect for law and authority, and brotherhood,’”207 
while Susan Bitensky nominates environmentalism and abhorrence of 
genocide as the basic “ideational perquisites” for the continuance of 
our civilization.208  Brian Freeman concludes that schools should be 
free to promote a particular value system with respect to such purpor-
tedly non-controversial matters as “personal honesty and integrity, 
family life and responsibilities, sexual standards, and the harmful ef-
fects of drug and alcohol abuse.”209  These examples demonstrate the 
difficulties of selecting a discrete set of values as constitutionally ap-
proved for inculcation in public schools. 
3.  Identifying Proscribed Values 
In contrast to the scholarly efforts to reconcile any inclusion of val-
ues in public school curricula with freedom of conscience, the Su-
preme Court’s approach has been one of case-by-case exclusion.  That 
is, the Court has permitted—at times, enthusiastically endorsed—a 
 
205 Shiffrin, supra note 95, at 651–52. 
206 Id. 
207 Joel S. Moskowitz, The Making of the Moral Child:  Legal Implications of Values Education, 6 
PEPP. L. REV. 105, 136 (1978) (quoting J. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools:  A Proposed 
Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329 (1963)). 
208 Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free Speech Clause with Curricu-
lar Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 769, 835–36 (1995). 
209 Brian A. Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students in the Public 
School Classroom:  A Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 56 (1984). 
Mar. 2011] TEACHING VALUES, TEACHING STEREOTYPES 633 
 
wide range of values training in public schools, subject only to a few 
specific exceptions for religious indoctrination, partisan advocacy, 
and the promotion of white supremacy. 
If the Court is ever to confront the more fundamental questions 
about values imposition that are raised in the scholarly literature, it 
will have to work its way up to doing so through a larger collection of 
specific examples.  The Court is unlikely to adopt the initial stance 
recommended by much of the scholarly literature—skepticism about 
all values imposition—and build from there through a theory of in-
clusion.  If, however, it is able to proceed step by step, first identifying 
the most pernicious types of values imposition, it may eventually be in 
a position to grapple with the larger questions.  This Subsection de-
scribes the pernicious types that the Court has identified so far; Part 
III.B argues that dealing with sex stereotypes in sex education curri-
cula would be a good next step. 
The most obvious category of values that public schools are pro-
hibited from inculcating is the category of religious values.  This pro-
scription has an independent basis in the Establishment Clause, so 
the Court has not had to rely solely on more abstract First Amend-
ment principles of freedom of thought and conscience.  The Court 
has repeatedly held that religious values cannot be forced upon—or 
even suggested to—students in government-operated schools.210 
The Supreme Court has also hinted at a narrow proscription of 
partisan political advocacy under the First Amendment.  In Board of 
Education v. Pico,211 for example, even the dissenters agreed that a 
school board could not remove all books by Democrats or all books 
by Republicans from the school library.212  Presumably a similar prin-
ciple would apply to curricular engagement with partisan politics, 
along the lines of the fairness doctrine proposed by scholars.  It 
seems, unlikely, however, that the Court will have to do much work in 
this area.  The political structure and close community supervision of 
schools should usually be sufficient to keep schools neutral on mat-
 
210 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (invalidating a policy 
regarding prayer at high school football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 585–86 
(1992) (holding that prayers at graduation ceremony impermissibly established religion); 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 41–42, 48 (1985) (striking down a statute calling for the 
public school day to include a period of silence for “meditation or voluntary prayer”). 
211 Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
212 Id. at 870–71  (“If a Democratic school board, motivated by party affiliation, ordered the 
removal of all books written by or in favor of Republicans, few would doubt that the order 
violated the constitutional rights of the students . . . .”); id. at 907 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (“I can cheerfully concede all of this.”). 
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ters that are live political disputes.213  First Amendment protection is 
much more likely to be needed to protect outliers and to articulate 
limits on imposing values that have broad community support. 
A few lower courts and several scholars have also suggested an in-
tersection of First and Fourteenth Amendment values that would pro-
scribe public school endorsement of racism.  The scholarly critiques 
have been aimed at both the hidden curriculum and any explicit en-
dorsement of racist values, while courts so far have limited themselves 
to remedying the latter. 
For example, David Burcham has proposed a First Amendment 
strategy for attacking racial bias in the hidden curriculum while 
avoiding the intent requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.214  
He argues that school children have a First Amendment right not to 
be inculcated with racist values, even unintentionally.215  De facto se-
gregation, therefore, may not be remediable under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but the racial message it conveys unconstitutionally in-
culcates children with racist values, and is thus subject to judicial re-
mediation.216 
Moving to the explicit curriculum, several scholars have argued 
that active promotion of white supremacy in the schools would be 
unconstitutional.  Arons and Lawrence, for example, have suggested 
that a prohibition on racist advocacy flows from the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself, as interpreted in Brown.217  Brown’s concern about 
the stigmatic harm of segregation would apply equally to racist advo-
cacy in the classroom; in addition, such advocacy would impede de-
segregation since it would deter black children from attending the 
school.218  Consistent with this theory, courts implementing Brown 
regularly considered curricular content as a gauge of whether a 
school had eliminated the vestiges of de jure segregation.219  Other 
scholars have suggested that the proscription of racist values would 
arise from general First Amendment restrictions on inculcating val-
ues, arguing that schools may inculcate only a core of important, con-
 
213 Admittedly, this statement may be overly optimistic, particularly in light of how many sex 
education programs treat controversial issues like abortion.  See supra note 35. 
214 David W. Burcham, School Desegregation and the First Amendment, 59 ALA. L. REV. 213 
(1995). 
215 See id. at 240. 
216 See id. at 243–57. 
217 See Arons & Lawrence, supra note 182, at 349–50. 
218 See generally Arons & Lawrence, supra note 182; text accompanying notes 125–127. 
219 See Wendy Brown Scott, Transformative Desegregation:  Liberating Hearts and Minds, 2 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 327 (1999). 
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stitutionally sanctioned values, including the constitutional value of 
racial equality.220 
Outside the context of remedial desegregation, however, direct 
claims of racially biased curricula have met with little success.  In 
most cases, their failure is due to courts’ distinction between teaching 
racism and teaching about racism.  Under Fourteenth Amendment 
doctrine, the school’s benign intent to do the latter—which courts 
presume—trumps any evidence regarding actual effects.221  Contrary 
to Burcham’s argument,222 courts have generally assumed that free 
speech principles weigh against judicial restrictions on curricular ma-
terial.  Only rarely has a court found evidence of discriminatory in-
tent sufficient to invalidate a curricular choice on Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds.223  Even where they do, the reasoning may not 
translate well to sex education cases, for the reasons discussed pre-
viously.224  First Amendment principles can help bridge this gap. 
B.  The First Amendment Frame 
While some scholars have insisted that any imposition of values by 
the government threatens First Amendment principles, the Supreme 
Court’s restrictions on values-imposition do not go nearly so far.  The 
Court has indicated that inculcation of specific values may go much 
further than the minimum that is inherent in the existence of public 
schools.  In Ambach v. Norwick, the Court explicitly endorsed the 
transmission of patriotic values as a legitimate function of public 
schools.225  More recently, the Court has endorsed anti-drug proselyt-
izing as part of the core mission of a public school.226  In short, the 
Court has consistently suggested that schools should inculcate stu-
dents with favorable opinions of democracy, American forms of go-
vernance, and some of our basic constitutional values—including, 
 
220 See Norman B. Lichtenstein, Children, the Schools, and the Right to Know:  Some Thoughts at the 
Schoolhouse Gate, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 91, 135–36 (1985) (using the First Amendment concept 
of group defamation to argue that schools should not be allowed to adopt curricular ma-
terials that defame racial, ethnic, or religious groups). 
221 See, e.g., Monteiro v. Temple Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998); Short-
er v. St. Cloud State Univ., No. Civ. 00-1314RHK/RLE, 2001 WL 912367 (D. Minn. Aug. 
14, 2001); Grimes v. Sobol, 832 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
222 See supra text accompanying notes 214-216. 
223 See, e.g., Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1154 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (finding inten-
tional race discrimination in a school board’s rejection of a particular textbook). 
224 See supra Part II.D. 
225 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–80 (1979). 
226 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007). 
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importantly, Fourteenth Amendment values favoring racial equality.227  
It has also suggested that schools may endorse a wide range of other 
values, such as the value of not using drugs.  Schools do so both 
through express instruction and through ritual and other appeals to 
students’ emotions.228  Thus, in contrast to the broad theories ques-
tioning the legitimacy of any government-sponsored inculcation of 
values, the current doctrinal landscape is best understood not as 
scrupulously avoiding all unnecessary indoctrination but as permit-
ting indoctrination of values chosen by the state except in a few spe-
cial cases.  The scholarship discussed above raises a serious challenge 
to this complacency about the degree of indoctrination that is al-
lowed in public schools.  However, any effort to convince the Court to 
engage that challenge must offer the Court relatively modest first 
steps. 
The sex stereotypes in sex education provide such a first step be-
cause traditional gender roles, like religious values, may not be en-
trenched by state action.  The promotion of sex stereotypes can thus 
be judicially proscribed under the same approach developed for the 
Establishment Clause, known as the endorsement test.229 
Scholars seeking to limit values inculcation in the public schools 
have frequently turned to the Establishment Clause as a model for a 
judicial standard.230  Other scholars have also noted the conceptual 
similarity between the constitutional principles that govern sex and 
religion.  In both realms, we celebrate diversity while seeking equali-
ty:  “[T]he central aspiration of the law in each instance may be 
stated in broadly similar language:  to protect free exercise, whether 
of religion or life choices; and to proscribe governmental imposition 
of conventions, establishments of religion or sex-role stereotypes.”231  
David Cruz has elaborated on this similarity and argued that the anti-
stereotyping principles of the Equal Protection Clause requires both 
that gender be “disestablished” and that individuals have a right to 
 
227 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 823 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
228 On ritual and other emotional persuasion, see White, supra note 197. 
229 See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (blending the endorsement test with 
the Lemon test); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682–83 (2005) (using the endorsement 
test). 
230 See, e.g., Redish & Finnerty, supra note 182, at 106 (“In determining which activities inhe-
rently cross the constitutional line, we may draw a rough analogy to the Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.  As the Supreme Court has interpreted that Clause, schools may 
discuss religious issues; they are, however, prohibited from promoting either particular 
religions or the idea of religion.”). 
231 KIRP, YUDOF & FRANKS, supra note 192, at 120–21. 
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“free exercise” of gender.232  The problem of stereotyping in sex edu-
cation, which sits at the intersection of sex equality and freedom of 
conscience, is thus highly amenable to analysis through Establish-
ment Clause principles. 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been forged largely in the 
educational context, so courts are practiced in assessing claims of 
curricular bias.233  Using the Establishment Clause as a model, courts 
should hold that public schools may not endorse adherence to ste-
reotypical gender roles, just as they may not endorse adherence to a 
particular religious belief or practice. 
The Establishment Clause is ideal for bridging the gap between 
the Supreme Court’s condemnation of white supremacy and its more 
tepid proscriptions on sex stereotypes.  Religious values are not con-
trary to the Constitution as is white supremacy; it is the entrenchment 
of religion by state action that is contrary to the Constitution.  An Es-
tablishment Clause approach thus sits more comfortably with the 
Court’s simultaneous “celebration” of sex difference and prohibition 
on using the power of the state to entrench current statistical differ-
ences.234  Endorsing sex stereotypes in sex education entrenches them 
through the mechanisms described in Part I.B.  The Equal Protection 
Clause clearly prohibits state entrenchment of sex stereotypes, and 
the red herring of truth or falsity drops out of the equation.235  To the 
 
232 David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2002). 
233 Only the issue of Christmas decorations rivals education as an object of attention under 
the Establishment Clause. 
234 See The VMI Case, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
235 Resort to the Establishment Clause’s endorsement test in the sex education context does 
not constitute an end-run around the intent requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.  
For comparison, in the context of racial segregation, David Burcham has proposed a First 
Amendment approach to address the racist effects of facially neutral state action.  Bur-
cham used the Lemon test rather than the endorsement test; at the time he wrote, the en-
dorsement test had not yet reached the prominence it enjoys today.  The Lemon test ex-
pressly goes beyond the intent requirement of equal protection by prohibiting state 
action with the purpose or primary effect of promoting religious doctrine.  Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).  Burcham, however, erroneously argues that the 
Lemon test is met because de facto segregation is primarily caused by state action.  Bur-
cham, supra note 214, at 243.  The fact that Y is primarily caused by X does not establish 
that Y is the primary effect of X.  (Y is de facto segregation; X is the state’s facially race-
neutral action that produces de facto segregation.)  For the reasons discussed in the text, 
the endorsement test better serves Burcham’s purpose.  Moreover, under equal protec-
tion doctrine the intent requirement attaches to the classification, not to its invidiousness.  
The legislature in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down a sex classification 
with respect to the purchase of low-alcohol beer), did not need to intend invidious dis-
crimination to trigger intermediate scrutiny:  it only needed to intend to classify on the 
basis of sex.  The intent to classify on the basis of sex is proven each time a sex education 
curriculum makes separate recommendations to girls and boys.  See supra Part II.A. 
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extent that an Establishment Clause-based analysis highlighted the 
prescriptive quality of gender scripts, rather than stereotypes as over-
generalizations, it might also push the jurisprudence of sex classifica-
tions toward a greater focus on hierarchy and subordination, rather 
than fair treatment of statistical outliers. 
The endorsement test offers several advantages in this context, as 
compared to the usual doctrinal script of equal protection.  The test 
asks whether a reasonable observer would construe the state’s action 
as an endorsement of religion.236  It thereby elides baseline problems 
and limits the scope of judicial review.  The test inherently incorpo-
rates context, such as the difference between discussing sex differ-
ences in Psychology class and advocating sex-differentiated roles in 
sex education.  It also quite cleverly circumvents post-modern objec-
tions to attributing an inherent meaning to a text.  Instead, the en-
dorsement test asks how a reasonable observer in the relevant speech 
community would understand the text.  While there would be some 
doctrinal work to be done to adapt the endorsement test to the eval-
uation of sex stereotypes, the basic theory of the test is well-suited to 
the task. 
Some of that doctrinal work involves defining the scope of the 
prohibition, which should be relatively narrow.  That is, a public 
school is prohibited from endorsing archaic gender scripts that con-
tain the same stereotypes that government is forbidden to entrench 
in other contexts.  The school is not, however, forbidden from taking 
positions on matters pertaining to sex roles or, especially, from en-
dorsing the constitutional value of sex equality.  The approach sug-
gested here thus differs from David Cruz’s theory of disestablishing 
gender.  Cruz suggests that full disestablishment would require gov-
ernment neutrality between traditional sex roles and other ideologies 
of gender.237  Cruz’s approach may be preferable in contexts where 
the state acts coercively or distributes rights and benefits.  In the edu-
cational context, however, it would be anomalous to require the state 
to be neutral on the question of equality, a matter on which the Con-
stitution itself is not neutral.238  The constitutional principles against 
 
236 See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (blending the endorsement test with 
the Lemon test); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (using the endorsement test). 
237 Cruz, supra note 232, at 1009. 
238 There are already suggestions floating around that say the existence of women’s studies 
programs and Afrocentric curricula are discriminatory.  See Corey Kilgannon, Lawyer Files 
Antifeminist Suit Against Columbia, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM (Aug. 18, 2008, 3:16 PM), 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/18/lawyer-files-antifeminist-suit-against-
columbia/ (reporting the filing of a lawsuit charging Columbia University with sex dis-
crimination for having a women’s studies program); see also Steven Siegel, Ethnocentric 
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endorsing or condemning a particular religious belief do not prevent 
public schools from  teaching evolution just because it is inconsistent 
with some religious beliefs.  Similarly, the constitutional principle 
against entrenching archaic gender scripts does not prevent govern-
ments from fulfilling their Fourteenth Amendment obligation to seek 
equality for all citizens.  The means for doing so may include promot-
ing the ideal of equality through instruction in public schools. 
Finally, the analogy to the Establishment Clause also makes an 
important point regarding the appropriate scope of judicial relief in 
a challenge to stereotyping in sex education.  It might seem an ap-
propriate remedy to give students the right to opt out of sex educa-
tion courses that promote sex stereotypes, as the Supreme Court did 
with the Pledge of Allegiance in West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette.239  This accommodation might seem especially appropriate 
in sex education because there is an existing custom of opt outs:  
most states allow parents to opt their children out of comprehensive 
sex education classes that include information about contraception 
and certain other subjects.  Parents are generally notified in advance 
of the content that is deemed controversial and can follow a proce-
dure to remove their children from the class.  By contrast, we have 
been unable to find any example of a school giving parents the right 
to opt out of “abstinence-only” classes, where sex stereotypes appear 
to be the most widespread.  There would be an appealing parity in al-
lowing parents who object to opt out of the stereotypes, just as other 
parents are allowed to opt out of comprehensive classes.  A right to 
opt out could be useful in raising awareness of the problem and lead-
ing to change through democratic processes. 
An opt-out right, however, would not be an appropriate remedy 
for the endorsement of sex stereotypes in the classroom.  The opt-out 
approach would lend inappropriate credence to the view that public 
school curricula are a menu from which parents can pick and choose.  
It would also suggest that opposition to sex stereotypes is an idiosyn-
 
Public School Curriculum in a Multicultural Nation:  Proposed Standards for Judicial Review, 40 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 311, 351–56 (1996) (arguing that Afrocentric programs are unconsti-
tutional because they promote segregation).  Siegel’s argument is based on several du-
bious assumptions, including:  that the desire to meet the needs of African American stu-
dents is equivalent to intent to segregate, for purposes of the rigorous intent requirement 
of the Equal Protection Clause; that such segregation causes the same kind of intangible 
harm that was denounced in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and that an 
Afrocentric curriculum is deviant and racially biased, while a Eurocentric curriculum is 
neutral. 
239 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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cratic personal belief rather than a constitutional value.240  Finally, an 
opt-out right would inappropriately locate the right in the parent ra-
ther than the child.  While as a practical matter a child would need a 
parent’s assistance to challenge improper endorsement of sex stereo-
types, the resulting court decision would accrue to the benefit of all 
children in the class.  Parents cannot consent to have the government 
promote anti-constitutional values in their children, whether those 
values be sex stereotypes or religious beliefs. 
Notably, the Supreme Court has never suggested that a right to 
opt out would cure Establishment Clause problems in public school 
classrooms.241  In Barnette, an opt out was appropriate because the val-
ue the school sought to instill was itself permissible, but the student 
was nonetheless entitled not to personally affirm it.242  The case 
against sex stereotypes in sex education rests primarily on the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibition on entrenchment of sex stereotypes.  
The First Amendment’s endorsement test is useful as a model, devel-
oped in the main context in which the Court deals with government 
entrenchment of impermissible values.  Opt outs would not be an 
appropriate solution to government endorsement of values contrary 
to the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The problematic stereotypes in sex education curricula consist 
primarily of normative endorsement of traditional gender roles.  
These endorsements are likely to have real and pernicious effects on 
the students who are exposed to them.  Such entrenchment of tradi-
 
240 For these reasons, there is not generally a right to opt out of educational activities that 
conflict with personal beliefs.  See Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 
1062, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting a free exercise challenge to public school curricular 
materials to which the plaintiffs objected because, among other things, the materials 
asked children to make moral judgments and described women who had been recog-
nized for achievements outside the home).  Before Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990), there appeared to be an exception to this rule, allowing some opt outs under 
the Free Exercise Clause, but Smith calls that practice into question.  While courts have 
been appropriately skeptical of free exercise claims to selectively opt out of the general 
curriculum, the values—and conduct—shaping aims of sex education probably warrant 
the greater consideration of parental values that many schools provide. 
241 The optional nature of the activity has sometimes been a factor in analyzing religious ac-
tivity at extra-curricular activities that take place separately from the regular school day, 
such as football games and graduation ceremonies.  Even in those contexts, the Court has 
been highly skeptical of arguments that rely on the optional nature of the activity to relax 
the requirements of the Establishment Clause. 
242  Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 631 (stating that the state may seek to inspire patriotism through 
education but may not compel a student to declare a belief). 
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tional gender roles by the state is contrary to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Any legal challenge, however, should propose a judicial 
standard modeled on the First Amendment’s endorsement test, ra-
ther than rely solely on existing Fourteenth Amendment case law in a 
way that would incorrectly imply that the challengers sought to sup-
press factually true information for the sake of ideology. 
